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Abstract
This essay analyzes the long-run economic effects of HIV/AIDS in Kenya, with
emphasis on fertility, education and child labor. Human capital, which is built up
through formal education and parental child-rearing, is the only input in produc-
tion. Two aspects are central to the analysis: First, a mature AIDS epidemic causes
massive premature adult mortality, thereby destroying existing human capital and
reducing the labor force on a large scale. Second, the transmission of human capital
to future generations is weakened, as children are left orphaned and surviving adults
are correspondingly burdened. As a consequence, per capita income decreases and
communities can less afford to raise and educate children as they did before the
outbreak of the disease. The underlying theoretical model, in which it is assumed
that parents raise and educate children for both financial and altruistic reasons, is
calibrated using data for the period 1920 to 2000. The long-run effects of the disease,
which depend heavily on parents’ expectations about future mortality rates, are es-
timated for the years 2000-2040. Both human capital and per capita income grow
significantly more slowly after the outbreak of the epidemic, while the incidence of
child labor doubles for some periods. The level of fertility falls in the immediate
aftermath of the outbreak, but can be significantly higher when the epidemic has
reached a mature phase, depending on parents’ expectations. Governmental inter-
ventions in the health sector in the early phase of the epidemic can strongly mitigate
its adverse effects.
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21 Introduction
Kenya declared the HIV/AIDS epidemic a national disaster in 1999, 15 years after the
first HIV/AIDS case had been reported. By that time, more than half a million Kenyans
were estimated to have died of the disease, and some 2.5 million adults were infected.
Other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had reacted to the epidemic more than a decade
earlier – notably Kenya’s neighbor Uganda, which had declared AIDS a national disaster
in 1986. Expectations in Kenya in 1999 were grim: the death rate was projected to rise
from 560 persons per day in 2000 to 760 by 2005.1 While governmental interventions
following the 1999 declaration seem to have borne some fruit, and the death rate had
even been reduced to 300 per day by 2003,2 the epidemic has not yet been brought under
complete control.
Most new infections occur among young people, particularly women aged 15 to 24 and
men aged 30 and younger.3 As 70 per cent of all Kenyan children are born to mothers
younger than 30, high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in this age group will strongly affect
the way families raise and educate children. As the parents become ill, family income is
reduced, either because they cannot work or because of the stigma towards those infected,
who have difficulty finding employment. The high costs of treatment further increase the
burden on the household’s income. Children raised in families affected by HIV/AIDS
often enjoy less parental guidance and care, and their education suffers, as they may have
to work to support their parents and siblings. As therapies are often too costly, most vic-
tims die within 8-10 years of being infected, leaving their children orphans. By 2003, 37%
of all orphans were AIDS orphans, up from an estimated 3% in 1990 and 22% in 1995.4
Even the education of those children whose parents are not ill suffers, as their teachers are
often too sick to conduct their classes. The Kenya Teachers Service Commission reports
that deaths among teachers more than tripled between 1995 and 1999, rising from 450 to
1500 per year.5 On average, 1.4% of all teachers are expected to die of HIV/AIDS yearly
between 2000 and 2010.6
As women of child-bearing age are strongly affected by the disease, and may transmit
1Source: http : //www.standwithafrica.org/hiv aids/reality1.php
2Source: http : //www.aegis.com/news/afp/2003/AF031233.html
3Source: http : //www.unaids.org/EN/Geographical +Area/by + country/kenya.asp
4Sources: 1990 and 1995 figures: ‘Children on the Brink‘,2002, U.N.AIDS, UNICEF and USAID
collaboration. 2003 figure: ‘Children on the Brink‘, 2004, U.N.AIDS, UNICEF and USAID collaboration
5Source: ‘Education and HIV/AIDS: A window of hope’, The World Bank, 2002
6Source: ibid.
3the virus on giving birth, the total number of children raised by a family is also expected
to change. Yet only 30% of all women know that taking anti-retroviral drugs during late
pregnancy can reduce the risk of Mother-To-Child-Transmission, according to the ‘Kenya
Demographic and Health Survey’ conducted in 2003. Two different effects are possible:
on the one hand, with potential mothers falling ill and dying and higher child mortality
due to HIV/AIDS, completed familiy size could fall. On the other hand, families might
respond to the rise in mortality by having more children, enough of whom would then
survive to take care of their parents when these cannot care for themselves, either due to
HIV/AIDS or to old age.
Several studies have projected the impact of the epidemic in Kenya, focusing on eco-
nomics, the health and education sectors, the development of the population size or spe-
cific population groups, like orphans or women. While macroeconomic empirical studies
in the 1990s (e.g. Bloom and Mahal (1997)) suggest that the effects of the HIV/AIDS
epidemics on the economies of Sub-Saharan African countries are small, more recent work
suggests that the effects on specific countries or regions may be very damaging. Bell,
Devarajan and Gersbach (2003), for example, simulate the South African economy for
the years 1990-2080 and show that the effects of the epidemic will indeed be strong, with
a distinct possibility of a collapse of the economy in the absence of government action.
Arndt and Lewis (2000) use a shorter simulation period, namely, 1997-2010, and find
that both total and per capita GDP are substantially lower in the face of the epidemic,
compared to the counterfactual without HIV/AIDS. Bollinger, Stover and Nalu (1999)
review several studies of the impact of AIDS in Kenya, and analyze the economic impact
of the epidemic on that country’s households, agriculture, firms and macroeconomy. They
conclude by recommending measures aimed at mitigating the effects of the disease and
emphasise the importance of governmental commitment to addressing HIV-related prob-
lems, and treating the disease as a ‘national priority’.
Ferreira and Pessoa (2003) consider a continuous-time model with premature mortal-
ity due to HIV/AIDS where an individual’s decision about schooling depends on her life
expectancy. They arrive at the conclusion that HIV/AIDS has a strong impact on long-
term growth, as individuals reduce formal education when their life expectancy falls. The
model is applied to several African countries, and the authors show that schooling falls, on
average, by half, while income falls by about a quarter in the presence of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic.
4Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2004) consider a 2-generation OLG model where indi-
viduals can die prematurely before the start of the last period of life. They consider
several scenarios, depending on the duration and strength of HIV/AIDS mortality shock.
Growth rates in all scenarios fall when the epidemic breaks out, and recover if the shock is
not permanent, that is, if morality rates subsequently return to their pre-epidemic level.
The authors provide an extended version of their initial model in Corrigan, Glomm and
Mendez (2005), where individuals live for up to three periods. The process of human
capital formation is not only dependent on the parents’ survival, but also on the time
the child spends pursuing formal education rather than working. In addition to deciding
about their own consumption and savings, parents, who are assumed to be altruistic, now
also decide about their offsprings’ schooling and consumption. If an individual is infected
with the HIV virus, he also decides about spending on medical treatment, and does not
save. The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are large, reducing the current income after
10 generations by 5-45% of potential NO-AIDS income, depending of the scenario.
Young (2005) analyses South Africa, calibrating a Beckerian model of household behav-
ior to Household Survey and Demographic and Health Survey Data. He then simulates
various scemarios concerning household response to HIV/AIDS, and finds that per capita
income can be larger in the presence of the epidemic, as fertility, and thereby the future
labor force, are reduced, and this effect dominates the reduction in schooling orphans
experience.
Bell et al. (2004) employ a three-generation OLG model to simulate the effects of the
disease in Kenya up to 2050. Unlike the South African case, they find that the Kenyan
economy is not threatened with a collapse, but GDP in the AIDS case is lower by about
40% in 2040 compared to the counterfactual without AIDS, and population is lower by
about a third. Kenya’s long-term problems are attributed to three interrelated factors:
first, the ’weakening of the mechanisms through which human capital is transmitted from
one generation to the next’; second, a sharp drop in the productivity of human capital in
the decade following 1990; and third, the HIV/AIDS epidemic. To analyze the effects of
these mechanisms on the Kenyan economy, Bell et al. (2004) focus on household decisions
concerning education.
The purpose of the present essay is to extend their analysis by incorporating households’
fertility decisions, as it seems realistic to assume that families react to exogenous shocks
to mortality by adjusting not only the level of schooling, but also the number of children
5they intend to have in the first place. The essay will draw upon Bell et al. (2004), par-
ticularly where the model’s structure and the data are concerned.
The essay is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a historical overview and discusses
the data used. The model is introduced in section 3, and its calibration is presented in
section 4. Several variations of projections of the Kenyan economy until 2040 are discussed
in sections 5 and 6, while the issue of public policy is taken up in section 7. The issue
of formulating and measuring social welfare in the presence of premature adult mortality
is addressed in section 8. The main results are stated in section 9, with conclusions in
section 10.
2 Historical Overview and Data: 1920-2000
At the beginning of the 20th century, Kenya was a British Protectorate officially called
‘British East Africa’. Inland colonization by white settlers began around 1901, when
the railway line connecting Mombasa and Lake Victoria was completed. By 1920, 9000
settlers were living in Kenya, and by 1950 their number had increased nearly 10-fold.7
Control over nearly all economic activity was concentrated in their hands, and the indige-
nous population was either employed as workers on the coffee farms, or engaged in mostly
low-productivity traditional occupations. Legislation prevented the African population
from purchasing and owning property in the highly fertile Kenyan Highlands and from
taking part in government. It was only in 1944, that the first African became a member of
the Colony’s Legislative Council.8 The inequalities in economic and political power led to
unrest, culminating in the Mau Mau Uprising between 1952 and 1960. While the uprising
was suppressed by British troops, some of the Mau Mau’s aims – like land reform – were
attained in subsequent years.
In 1963, Kenya gained independence, and Jomo Kenyatta became its first president. He
was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi in 1978, who stayed in power until 2002. After Inde-
pendence, several reforms were undertaken, especially in the spheres of land policy, the
educational system, and the political system. Many of these reforms – particularly those
regarding education – can be observed in the time series used in this essay, to which we
now turn.
7Source. http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/africa/nairobi/printable.htm
8Source: http://www.kenyalogy.com/eng/info/histo12.html
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Decadal data on the economies’ output and demography for the years 1950 to 2000 are
used, as well as data on the average years of schooling from 1920 onwards. A detailed
discussion of the time series and revisions is given in Bell et al. (2004), on which this
section draws. For the remainder of the essay, the round years will be used as time points,
whereby the variable t = 1, 2, 3..., 14 denotes the number of decades elapsed since the year
1900, so that t = 10 denotes the decade starting in the year 2000.
2.1 Population
During the period of interest, five censuses were conducted in Kenya, in the years 1948,
1962, 1969, 1979 and 1989. The United Nations Population Division, the World Bank (in
the form of the World Development Indicators, WDI) and the Penn World Tables (PWT)
provide secondary data on the Kenyan population and its structure. For the purposes
of the calibration, data for the years 1950-1990 are used, with estimates for the nearest
round date in the case of the Census figures.
The WDI does not report the total population for 1950, and its data for 1960 onwards are
identical to the UN’s, as are the PWT data. However, the population in the PWT for 1950
is higher than both the UN and Census data by 3.6% and 7.7% respectively. Bell et al.
(2004) reconstruct the early part of the series and reject the PWT’s estimates for that year.
Both the UN Population Division and the Censuses provide data on the age distribu-
tion. Except for the first and last group, which include infants aged 0-5 and people aged
65 and older, respectively, all 8 age groups span 10 years, their mid-points being 10, 20,
30, 40, 50 and 60. Age-groups will be denoted by the index a = 0, . . . , 7 and the size9 of
an age group in period t will be denoted by Nat . As both estimates are problem-ridden, a
revised series was derived, in which the implicit age-specific death rates (defined below)
are higher for those 35 and older than those implicit in of the original UN data. As a
consequence, old cohorts are smaller, while young cohorts are relatively larger than the
U.N.’s. Denote the mortality rate in age group i over the period t to t+ j − i, (j > i) in
period t by qi,jt . The age-specific death rate for age group a is defined as the probability
that a member of age group a will not survive to become a member of age group (a+ 1)
10 years later, and will be denoted by qa,a+1t . Mortality rates can then be computed from
9The unit of Nat and of all other population data in the essay is 10
3.
2.2 Output 7
Table 1: Population Tables
age group/year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0-4 1040 1541 2294 3482 4458 4696
5-14 1606 2317 3371 4951 7182 9006
15-24 1192 1491 2167 3179 4715 6875
25-34 882 1097 1381 2019 2979 4447
35-44 634 784 983 1248 1833 2731
45-54 441 542 677 857 1099 1634
55-64 240 349 432 545 698 911
65+ 125 201 238 351 511 864
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
the population tables as follows:
qi,jt = 1−
N jt+(j−i)
N it
.
In the remainder of the essay, the probability that a member of age group a = 2 reaches
age group a = 4 will play a major role. It will be denoted by κt :
κt ≡ 1− q3,5t =
N5t+2
N3t
. (1)
2.2 Output
Both the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators provide data on
aggregate output, with the PWT time series starting in 1950 and the WDI 10 years later.
The PWT contains data on per capita GDP in constant purchasing power units with
the base year 1995, as well as population data. As discussed in the previous section, the
PWT population estimate for 1950 is implausibly high; so that total GDP for that year is
derived using the revised estimate instead. The two series do not differ significantly for the
following years, and the PWT series is chosen, being the longer of the two. As the purpose
of the analysis is to derive long-term effects, short-term shocks to GDP are smoothed by
forming 5-year moving averages. As can be seen from table 2, the Kenyan economy
experienced a period of fast growth after Independence, but also a marked slowing down
after 1990, with per capita GDP actually falling. For the remainder of the paper, GDP
will be denoted by Yt.
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Table 2: GDP in Kenya, 1950-2000
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
GDP (107) 436 642 1089 2014 3076 3633
Average annual GDP growth (%) – 3.9 5.4 6.3 4.3 1.7
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
2.3 Educational Attainment
The educational system in Kenya underwent several major changes in the last century.
The Department of Education was founded in 1911, but only 3% of the country’s African
population had enjoyed any formal education by 1925 (Thias and Carnoy, 1972). Pri-
mary education was financed and organised by the communities and missionaries, and no
common curriculum existed. Until Kenya gained independence in 1963, the African pop-
ulation received mostly technical and vocational training, as recommended by the Fraser
Report of 1909. The Ominde Commission, set up in 1964, led to changes in the school-
ing system which aimed at increasing enrolments in secondary education. Up to 1966,
primary and secondary education spanned 8 and 4 years respectively. Primary education
was reduced to 7 years after 1966, but was extended again to 8 years in 1985, with all
schools using the same curriculum. By 1973, school fees had been abolished for the first
6 years of primary education, following UNESCO’s proposals. This led to high enrolment
rates, particularly so in 1974 and 1979. As a consequence, the government hired a sub-
stantial number of new teachers, many of them poorly trained, thereby possibly reducing
the quality – albeit not the quantity – of educational inputs. To finance these addi-
tional teachers, schools introduced a plethora of new, compulsory, fees, such as building
and equipment levies. According to Nkinyangi (1982), ”the cost of schooling as much as
quadrupled in some ditricts” 10 after the levies were introduced. While some of these fees
were abolished in subsequent years, primary schooling only became genuinely free in 2003.
Two data sets are used to determine the average years of completed schooling: the Cen-
suses mentioned in section 2.1 and reports by the ministry of education. A very detailed
description of the method is given in Bell et al. (2004), the results of which are set out in
table 3. The variable et denotes the average years of schooling of the school-age cohort in
period t, expressed as a fraction of a 12-year schooling period.
10Nkinyanngi (1982), pp 204.
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Table 3: Educational Attainment
Year 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Education et 0.047 0.080 0.134 0.201 0.367 0.458 0.520 0.570
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
2.4 School Fees
Several surveys have studied household spending, and found that households spend about
3-5.5% of their total income on schooling. A summary of the studies’ findings is given in
table 4. School fees amounted to about 50% of total spending on education in 1994, and
were abolished by 2003. As data on household income and expenditures is available until
1990, the costs of sending one child to school for one period, σt, can be computed from:
σtetN
1
t = 0.04 Yt ⇔
σt ≡ 0.04 Yt/(etN1t ) ∀t ≤ 9. (2)
As et, N
1
t and Yt are endogenous after 1990, σt cannot be computed using the equation
above for t > 9. Instead, it will be assumed that all school-going costs remained constant
after 1990, with the exception of school fees, which were abolished. From this, we set:
σt = σ9/2 ∀t > 9. (3)
Table 4: Household Spending on Education: Surveys
Survey School Fees Spending on Education
Rural Household Survey Nyanza
Province 1970/71
2.2
Urban Houshehold Budget Survey
1993/94
5.5a
Welfare Monitoring Survey II 1994 1.4b 2.9b
Welfare Monitoring Survey II 1994 2.0c 4.0c
Welfare Monitoring Survey III 1997 5.5
a Recreation and Education
b Mean Household Expenditure
c Mean Household Expenditure - with Enrolled Children
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3 The Model
The basic model describes household decisions concerning the bearing and rearing of chil-
dren in the presence of premature adult mortality, for example, due to HIV/AIDS.
It is assumed that households consist of three generations, namely, children, parents and
grandparents, each of whom is endowed with one unit of time. Children divide their time
between working and learning, where the fraction of time assigned to education will be
denoted by e ∈ [0, 1]. Surviving parents work full-time, as do grandparents until the age
of 65. It is assumed that parents receive the income of the entire family, including that
accruing to the grandparents, and then redistribute this income according to some set of
social rules, which are described below.
For simplicity, it is assumed that parents (father and mother) are identical with respect
to both their levels of human capital and their mortality rates. They raise and educate
children in order to increase their own current consumption and to finance their old age.
As investment in physical capital is ruled out by assumption,11 and grandparents work
part-time only, they also rely on transfers from their children to finance their consump-
tion. A fixed fraction χ ∈ (0, 1) of the family’s income is transferred to the grandparents.
There are no bequests. Raising children is costly, and the better educated parents are,
the more they spend on raising their children. School fees, which make up about half of
the total costs of primary education in Kenya, were abolished only in 2003.
The temporal structure of the model is as follows: When they reach age group a = 2
young adults form couples and decide on the number of children they intend to have and
raise. They also enter into a binding contract on the education these children are to
receive when they reach school-going age. If parents have perfect foresight about child
mortality and if there is ’replacement fertility’, as in Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003),
then a decision about fertility is equivalent to deciding about N1t , and we will take N
1
t as
the corresponding decision variable for the remainder of the essay. When parents are in
age groups a = 2 and a = 3 their children go to school according to the decision made at
birth, as stated in the contract; their level of schooling is et, and the level of human capital
11While households in Kenya can save, for example by purchasing land or other assets, most of this
saving is precautionary saving. Retirement is not financed by savings, as shown by Hoddinott (1992):
Old-age consumption is financed mostly through agricultural income, transfers from children, wages and
business income. Other sources of income, such as pensions - which could be interpreted as a form of
saving - make up at most 5.2% of the total income for poor and middle-income households, and 30% for
richest decile. This suggests that pensions and other forms of savings are not available for the poor.
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(measured in efficiency units of labor) they attain upon reaching adulthood is denoted
by λt+1(et). In period t + 1, the children start working themselves, and have their own
children. When their parents reach age group a = 5 in period t + 2, they start receiving
transfers from the younger generations. Therefore, the total number of ’young couples’ in
period t will be (N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )/2, while the total number of ’old couples’ in period t+2
will be (N5t+2 +N
6
t+2 +N
7
t+2)/2.
It is assumed that the efficiency of a grown-up depends on the time she spent at school,
the average efficiency of her parents and the productivity of the educational process [see
Bell et al. (2004)]. If an individual does not spend any time at school, she will attain the
basic minimum level of efficiency λ = 1. It is assumed that adults in the two youngest age
groups (i.e. a = 2 and a = 3) are involved in educating children, and that the educational
technology is isoelastic with parameter ², as in Bell et al. (2004). The children which are
going to school in period t attain the following level of human capital in period t+ 1 :
λt+1 = 2zte
²
t
(
N2t λt +N
3
t λt−1
N2t +N
3
t
)
+ 1, zt, ² > 0 (4)
where zt(> 0) can be thought of as the strength of the mechanism for the inter-generational
transmission of knowledge. The growth rate of the adults’ level of efficiency in the case
of full-time schooling is:
gλ ≡ λt+1 − λt
λt
= 2zt
(
N2t +N
3
t
λt−1
λt
N2t +N
3
t
)
+
1
λt
− 1. (5)
Note first that the growth rate will always be positive if previous generations enjoyed no
schooling whatsoever, that is,12 if λt = λt+1 = 1. The growth rate gλ will be positive even
for high levels of efficiency if zt is greater than 0.5. If, however, zt is lower than 0.5, the
growth rate will depend on the level of λt : If λt is sufficiently close to one, gλ will be pos-
itive, whatever be the level of λt, as 1/λt is then sufficiently close to one.
13 If the adults’
level of efficiency is growing, however, the term in brackets will be lower than 1, while
1/λt will be falling, so that gλ will eventually be zero or negative. A steady-state in λ can
arise if zt is stationary, with the steady-state level of efficiency being λ
∗ = 1/(1 − 2zt).
Note that in a steady-state with respect to λ, population growth plays no role, as the
term in brackets in (5) will be 1 in all periods when λt = λt+1. The temporal structure
12This result is valid not only for the case of full-time schooling, but also for all et+1 > 0.
13For λt = 1, gλ is always positive, as 2zt
(
N2t+N
3
t
λt−1
λt
N2t+N
3
t
)
+ 11 − 1 > 0
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of the population pyramid, however, is important, as it influences the choice of et, and
therefore also determines whether stationary value of λ can be reached.
Income is generated through the production of a single, non-storable good. Let the ef-
ficiency of a school-age child be fixed at µ. Assume, further, that those younger than 5
and older than 65 years of age, that is, age groups a = 0 and a = 7, do not work at all.
Therefore, ignoring unemployment, the total labor supply (measured in efficiency units)
of an extended family in period t will be:
Lt = N
2
t λt +N
3
t λt−1 +N
4
t λt−2 +N
5
t λt−3 +N
6
t λt−4︸ ︷︷ ︸
adult labor
+N1t (1− et)µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
child labor
(6)
The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to
labor (measured in efficiency units). Given the long-term character of the model, assessing
the effects of land use in the production function is essential. However, data on land use,
development and quality is not available. While a data series on arable land is available at
the FAO, and reaches back to 1960, it does not include any information on the quality of
the land used, and no data are available for the years before 1960, nor are projections for
the future. To keep matters simple, therefore, we assume that the amount of land available
is constant, and shared by all adults. We also assume that households are autarchik.
Yt ≡ αt
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t +N
5
t +N
6
t )
A
· Lt = θt · Lt (7)
= θt · (N2t λt +N3t λt−1 +N4t λt−2 +N5t λt−3 +N6t λt−4 +N1t (1− et)µ),
where A ≥ 0 , αt > 0. The factor θt
(
= αt
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t +N
5
t +N
6
t )
A
)
, denotes the amount of
output produced with one unit of efficient labor. It has two components: its denominator
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t +N
5
t +N
6
t )
A captures the fact that the total amount of land is fixed, and
divided among all families equally. αt describes the general level of economic productivity.
It can change over time, for example, as a result of economic policy or macroeconomic
shocks.
The only active decision-makers in the present setting are the (young) parents, and the
decisions they make determine their level of consumption in the last phase of life, as well
as the level of efficiency their offspring will attain as adults. For simplicity, assume that
the parents’ decisions do not influence mortality rates.
Assume that raising infants is free, so that the level of consumption of a family which has
13
infants only is not influenced by their fertility decisions. Therefore, when making fertility
decisions in period t, parents, who are in age groups a = 2, 3 consider their (expected)
level of consumption while their children are going to school (denoted by c1, t) and later,
when they themselves are old, whereby only consumption in the first period of old age
is considered for simplicity (denoted by c2, t+2). The adults also possess altruism, which
expresses itself not only through the expenditures on educating and raising children, but
also in their concern for the children’s future welfare. For simplicity, it is further assumed
that the utility function is additively separable, whereby the level of utility of adults who
die prematurely is normalized to zero. Following Bell et al. (2004), we choose the form:
EtU(c1, t, c2, t+2, et, N
1
t ) = β0ln(c1, t) + β1κtln(c2, t+2) +
2N1t κt+1
N2t +N
3
t
(
1− λt+1(et)−η
)
(8)
where κt+k, k = 0, 1 is the parents’ subjective estimate thereof at time t.
Note that by choosing
φ =
2N1t κt+1
N2t +N
3
t
(
1− λt+1(et)−η
)
as the subutility function with respect to altruism and the education production function
in (4), equilibria with λt = 1 and et = 0 ∀t (poverty traps) are excluded by construction if
² < 1. To see this, differentiate the subutility function with respect to et+1, and evaluate
this derivative for et = 0:
lim
et→0
∂φ
∂et
=∞ ∀² < 1, ∀η.
As will be shown in the following section, the model can only be calibrated by choosing
² < 1, so that poverty traps are indeed excluded. The step in the calibration needed to
determine ² is independent of the choice of functional form for preferences, so that the
result ² < 1 will be valid even if the utility function took a different form. Therefore, as
long as the subutility function φ satisfies the condition limet→0
∂φ
∂et
= limet→0
∂φ
∂λt+1
∂λt+1
∂et
=
limet→0
∂λt+1
∂et
=∞, no poverty trap will exist. Stationary equilibria with respect to λ, how-
ever, can still exist if the parents’ choice of schooling and fertility satisfies the condition
λ = 2ztet(λ,N
2
t , N
3
t , . . . )
²λ+ 1 ∀t. Note, however, that this also implies some kind of equi-
librium with respect to population, so that et(λ,N
2
t , N
3
t , . . . ) = et+1(λ,N
2
t+1, N
3
t+1, . . . ) ∀t,
which seems unlikely.
Consider a family that raises N1t children in period t. Each pair of adults in the groups
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a = 2, 3, 4 receives the same fraction of the family’s total income:
Yt
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )/2
= θt · 2(N
2
t λt +N
3
t λt−1 +N
4
t λt−2 +N
5
t λt−3 +N
6
t λt−4)
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )·
+θt · 2N
1
t (1− et)µ
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )
.
A fixed fraction χ ∈ [0, 1] of the total output produced by adults is allocated to the
grandparents (a = 5, 6, 7), who consume it. Assume that each child consumes bλt units
per decade, and that one unit of schooling costs σt per child. Then the consumption of a
young couple in period t is:
c1,t = 2θt(1− χ)(N
2
t λt +N
3
t λt−1 +N
4
t λt−2 +N
5
t λt−3 +N
6
t λt−4)
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )
(9)
+ 2θt(1− et)µ N
1
t
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )
− 2bλt N
1
t
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )
− 2σtet N
1
t
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )
.
The share χ is divided equally among all old members of the family:
c2,t+2 = 2θt+2χ · (N
2
t+2λt+2 +N
3
t+2λt+1 +N
4
t+2λt +N
5
t+2λt−1 +N
6
t+2λt−2)
N5t+2 +N
6
t+2 +N
7
t+2
. (10)
When deciding about N1t and et parents can observe all relevant historical and current
values of N, λ and e, particularly λt and et, and the mortality rates in period t. They also
form expectations about future mortality rates, and hence expectations about Nat+k for
a = 2, . . . , 7, and k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Assume that parents have perfect foresight about all the qi,jt in all future periods t +
1, t + 2, . . . . They can also observe or deduce the levels of efficiency λt−2, λt−1 and λt
associated with age groups a = 5 and a = 6 in period t+2. All the other values needed to
determine c2, t+2, namely, N
2
t+2 and N
3
t+2 as well as λt+2 are unknown. The level of N
3
t+2
can be determined from N1t , which is endogenous, using N
3
t+2 = (1 − q1,3t )N1t . Similarly,
N2t+2 = N
1
t+1(1− q1,2t+1). However, the level of N1t+1 is not known to the parents when they
make their decisions. Therefore, parents must make conjectures about the future number
of school-going children and about et+1, which will determine λt+2. Given the complexity
of this structure, assume that parents use a simplifying rule: they expect the level of
schooling to be stationary:
Etet+1 = et−1, (11)
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and the number of school-age children raised by couples in a = 2 and a = 3 in period t+1
to be stationary too:
Et
(
2N1t+1
N2t+1 +N
3
t+1
)
=
2N1t−1
N2t−1 +N
3
t−1
⇔ EtN1t+1 = N1t ·
EtN
2
t+1 + EtN
3
t+1
N2t−1 +N
3
t−1
≡ N1t ψt.14 (12)
Note that N2t+1 appears in ψt, which is endogenous, as N
2
t+1 = N
1
t (1−q1,2t ). For simplicity,
however, the ratio ψt will be computed from the population tables (e.g. table 1).
Using (4), (9) and (10), the couple’s expected utility can be rewritten as a function
of N1t and et as well as Etet+1 and EtN
1
t+1 alone. Its optimization problem at time t is
then formulated as follows:
max
et,N1t
EtU(et, N
1
t ;Etet+1, EtN
1
t+1, ·) subject to Nmin ≤ N1t ≤ Nmax (13)
and 0 ≤ et ≤ 1
This yields two first-order conditions as functions of Etet+1 and EtN
1
t+1:
∂EtU(·;Etet+1, EtN1t+1)
∂N1t
and
∂EtU(·;Etet+1, EtN1t+1)
∂et
.
Together with (11) and (12) these yield, for an interior solution,
∂EtU(·)
∂N1t
∣∣∣∣
Etet+1=et−1,EtN1t+1=N
1
t ψt
= 0 and
∂EtU(·)
∂et
∣∣∣∣
Etet+1=et−1,EtN1t+1=N
1
t−1ψt
= 0, (14)
which, in turn, yield the optimal levels of N1t and et.
Note that in the present setup, there is no time-inconsistency regarding the parents’
decisions about et, as their expectations about mortality rates are correct by assumption
if there is no HIV/AIDS shock. That is, when their children reach school-going age,
parents have no incentives to depart from the binding contract on et which they made at
14An alternative specification, namely Etet+1 = et, and respectively Et
(
2N1t+1
N2t+1+N
3
t+1
)
= 2N
1
t
N2t+N
3
t
is not
well-defined, and could lead to non-unique solutions. Assume, for example, that parents expect future
fertility rates to be high and education to be low, and therefore choose a high fertility and low schooling
themselves, so that the expectations are satisfied. If, however, parents had assumed that fertility would
be low and education would be high, and would themselves had chosen a high level of et and a low level
of N1t , the expectations again would have been satisfied. The specification above, therefore, would have
been satisfied in both cases, and an additional rule would be required to choose between all possible
solutions.
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child-birth. If, however, the parents’ expectations about mortality rates prove to be incor-
rect, that is, if there is an unexpected mortality shock like the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic after the children are born but before they reach school-going age, it is unlikely
that the contractual level of et is still optimal, from the parents’ point of view. Therefore,
et might be open to renegotiation.
4 Calibration
The model presented in the previous section is calibrated to the data from section 2.
The data on output, population and education can be used to derive the adult’s level of
efficiency λt in each past generation, the children’s level of efficiency µ, the factors ², zt, A
and αt, which characterize the education and production functions, respectively, the social
rules governing transfers to the old and to children, χ and b, and the parameters of the
subutility functions, β0, β1 and η. This will be done in two steps: first, national aggregates
will be used to compute A, ², µ, zt, αt and λt. Second, the calibration of preferences will
yield the values of β0, β1, b, χ and η.
Step 1
The first step of the calibration is identical to the one employed in Bell et al. (2004). As
noted in section 2.3, only 3% of all adult Africans had enjoyed any education by 1925.
Therefore, it seems safe to assume that in 1910, before the Department of Education was
established, the general population had no education at all and their level of efficiency
was λ1 = 1, that is, the minimum possible. Following Bell et al. (2004), λ2 is set to 1.01.
Using this as an initial condition and equation (4) yields a set of 8 equations describing
the dynamics of the adults’ level of efficiency:
λt = 2zt−1e²t−1
(
N2t−1λt−1 +N
3
t−1λt−2
N2t−1 +N
3
t−1
)
+ 1, t = 3, . . . , 10 (15)
While no data on e10 are available yet, it seems reasonable to assume e10 = 0.621 (see
Bell et al. [2004]). The second condition used in the calibration gives the age groups’
contribution to GDP, as stated in equation (7):
Yt = θt(N
2
t λt+N
3
t λt−1+N
4
t λt−2+N
5
t λt−3+N
6
t λt−4+N
1
t (1− et)µ), t = 5, . . . , 10 (16)
where θt =
αt
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t +N
5
t +N
6
t )
A . The system described by (15) and (16) consists of 14
equations and 25 unknowns: αt for t = 5, . . . , 10, λt and zt for t = 3, . . . , 10 as well as
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µ, A and ², which are assumed to have stayed constant over time. As the system is
underdetermined, solving it is only possible by making assumptions about the values of
some of the variables.
Beginning with 1940, adults had enjoyed at least one year of schooling on average (see
table 3), which suggests that the measures undertaken in the education sector in the early
phase of the century had started to bear fruit. Therefore, the first shift in zt is assumed
to have taken place in 1940. The second shift came after Kenya abolished school fees
and reformed the educational system, that is, for the decade starting 1980. While per
capita GDP grew until 1990, it started to fall thereafter. Hence, we assume that α stayed
constant until t = 9, and dropped once, in t = 10. With these assumptions, the total of
14 variables associated with zt and αt is reduced to 5:
z2 = z3, z4 = z5 = z6 = z7, z8 = z9 = z10
α5 = α6 = α7 = α8 = α9, α10
To anchor the system, it is still necessary to choose two more variables. To simplify
the calculation, ² and A are chosen exogenously, as the equations are linear in all other
parameters. Solutions where ² < 0.47 or ² > 0.62 are not considered, as they yield either
negative values of one of the parameters, or µ > 1, that is, the labor efficiency of a child
is higher than that of an adult who did not enjoy any schooling. The exact value of ²
chosen should reflect the parents’ decisions regarding schooling. As these decisions are
determined by their preferences, we now turn to their calibration.
Table 5: Households’ choices of et and N
1
t
Year 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
et 0.047 0.080 0.134 0.201 0.367 0.458 0.520 0.570
N1t 1606 2317 3371 4951 7182
2N1t /(N
2
t +N
3
t ) 1.55 1.79 1.90 1.91 1.87
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
Step 2
Table 5 presents the households’ decisions concerning education and fertility for the years
1950 to 1990. As can be seen, an interior solution existed during the whole period15
15If the household decisions were corner solutions, this would imply that the social rule onNmin required
each family to raise at least 1.55 children. As such a high value of Nmin is rather restrictive, it seems
18
and the two conditions in (14) can be used to recover the preference parameters. For
any given value of ² and ensuing values of µ, λt, zt and αt, five parameters need to be
determined through a calibration of the preferences, namely, η, χ, b, β0 and β1. For com-
putational reasons, solving the system is only possible if one chooses η exogenously, using
a grid search method. The other variables are calibrated using (14) for the years 1970
and 1990. A plethora of results exists for the different values of ² and η: from all the
possible results, one with β0/β1 ≤ 1.0120 = 1.22 and c1,t/c2,t ≈ 1, t = 7, 9 is chosen.
The first condition (i.e. β0/β1 ≤ 1.0120) considers the the rate of pure impatience of
individuals. While there are no studies estimating this rate for Kenya, the rate is between
0.25 and 0.5% p.a. in the U.S., according to Fullerton and Rogers (2003) and Altig et
al. (1996). Consequently, we will irgnore all solutions where the pure impatiance lies
above 1% p.a. in Kenya. The second condition, namely c1,t/c2,t ≈ 1, implies that families
choose a fairly smooth path of consumption in the two periods of life, apart from the
eventuality of premature death, which is captured by the term κt+1 in (8). For all values
of A < 0.04 and A > 0.17, no solutions satisfying the conditions above exist. Similarly, if
² < 0.47, the calibration yields µ > 1, that is, a child’s level of labor efficiency is higher
than that of an adult who enjoyed no schooling whatsoever, which does not seem realistic.
A continuum of results satisfying all conditions above exists. To keep the number of
solutions manageable, we have chose a stepwidth of 0.01 for A, ² and η, which reduces the
number of solutions to 27. The summary statistics of all 27 solutions are set out in table
6.
Table 6: Calibration results: summary statistics
Parameter Min Max Average
A 0.06 0.17 0.10
² 0.52 0.54 0.53
η 0.57 2.06 1.44
µ 0.35 0.69 0.54
χ 0.08 0.18 0.13
Time Preference a 0.49 0.99 0.72
Dropb in αt 18.28 19.13 18.64
Dropc in zt 43.18 45.92 44.79
Dropd in λt 10.09 15.41 13.32
a In % per year.
b Defined as −(α10 − α9)/α9 in %
c Defined as −(z8 − z7)/z7 in % d Defined as (λ8 − λ9)/λ8 in %
reasonable to assume that 1.55 children per family, as raised in 1950, constitutes an interior solution.
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Figure 1: Calibration Results (All Calibrations)
Min., Max., and Average refer to the minimum, maximum and average value λt takes over
all calibrations.
A value of A between 0.06 and 0.17 implies that, even if αt stays constant, the produc-
tivity of one unit of efficient labor (αt/(
∑6
a=2N
a
t )
A) has fallen as population has grown.
Working-age population (age groups 2–6) has more than tripled between 1950 and 1990,
which implies a reduction in productivity of 7% to 21% during that period. In all solutions
satisfying the conditions above, we get µ ∈ [0.35, 0.69] that is, a child’s labor efficiency
is lower by at least 30% than the efficiency of an uneducated adult. The transfer to the
grandparents amounts to 8-18% of the total income from adult labor. This is somewhat
lower than the grandparents’ share of the population (
N5t +N
6
t +N
7
tP7
a=0N
a
t
≈ 0.12 for t ≤ 9).
There were two sharp falls in the efficiency associated with the educational technology,
one in the 1930s and another in the 1970s, after the Kenyan government had started to
reform the school system yet again. The transmission factor zt fell by about 45% during
the 1970s, and settled at a value just above 0.5, (z9 ∈ [0.53, 0.61] in all solutions). With
zt sharply reduced, the growth rate of λ slows too; indeed, the young adults’ level of
efficiency falls between 1980 and 1990. The economy experiences another shock over the
period 1990 – 2000, as αt falls by about 19%. This shock has two effects: first, labor
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income is reduced. Second, raising children becomes relatively more expensive. Recalling
(9), note that the costs incurred in raising children depend on b, λt+1 and N
1
t+1 only,
16
and not on αt+1, which was constant during the years used in the calibration of b. As a
consequence, the ratio b/αt was constant too for t = 7 and t = 9. By 2000, however, the
ratio rises as αt falls, so that raising children is now relatively more expensive.
While the projections are computed for all 27 calibrations, we will present the results
of one specific calibration in detail to illustrate the processes underway. The aggregate re-
sults of all other calibrations will also be set out. The parameters of the calibration chosen
for a detailed description are set out in table 7, while the average values of the parameters
are reported in figure 1 and table 24 in the appendix. As can be seen from tables 7 and 24,
the calibration chosen for detailed description is, to some extent, the ’average’ calibration.
Table 7: Calibration Results
Exogenous:
A = 0.10 ² = 0.53 η = 1.46
Endogenous:
µ = 0.538 χ = 0.133 b = 273.94
β0 = 1.8801 β1 = 1.6132
t λt zt αt
2 1.01 1.6791 –
3 1.6688 1.6791 –
4 2.2192 1.0188 –
5 2.3917 1.0177 1357
6 3.0183 1.0177 1357
7 4.2922 1.0177 1357
8 6.1094 0.5613 1357
9 5.2868 0.5613 1357
10 5.6710 0.5613 1104
To summarize, the calibration is done in two steps: the first determines the parameters
of the technologies and historical values of λ, while the second deals with the preference
parameters. To derive the parameter values we have imposed two sets of restrictions:
16If the costs incurred in raising children were a function of α, the factor describing labor productivity
would drop out of the utility function, as this is logarithmic in form. As a consequence, all decisions on
children would be independent of α, which does not seem realistic.
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first µ ≤ 1, β0/β1 ≤ 1.0220, with β0 ≥ β1, and c1,t/c2,t ≈ 1, which have economic reasons
and are independent of the data employed or the country/problem analyzed. The second
set of restrictions imposed concerns zt and αt. These restrictions are specific to the data
set used, and hence to the country/historical experience it reflects. Changing any of the
restrictions will lead to significant changes in the calibration results, if any can be derived
at all. Koukoumelis (2005) shows that the calibration will, in general, be sensitive to even
small measurement errors in Y5, the 1950 GDP level. He also shows that the degree of
sensitivity to errors in Y5 can be reduced by choosing a different set of restrictions regard-
ing zt. In the present paper, we have kept the original restriction in Bell et al. (2004) in
order to ensure that the calibrations are comparable.
5 Projections: The Base Case
5.1 Preliminaries
Using the results of the calibrations presented in the previous section, the household deci-
sions regarding completed fertility and education are determined under several scenarios.
First, there is the benchmark case without HIV/AIDS, which is the counterfactual. Sec-
ond, there the AIDS scenario in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic breaks out, and families
fully recognize its effects during the 1990s, and adapt their earlier decisions about educa-
tion accordingly (Scenario 1). We assume that fertility decisions have already been fully
implemented by the time children are at school. Third, there is the case in which parents
fail to take notice of the epidemic’s effects until the late 1990s (Scenario 2). In all cases,
the projections start with N19 and e9, that is, the first decisions are made in period t = 8
and implemented/revised in period t = 9.
5.1.1 Data
To compute the projections, data on mortality rates for 2000 onwards are needed. For
both scenarios, revised projections based on those made by the US Bureau of Census are
used, following Bell et al. (2004). The population pyramids for both cases are given in
tables 8 and 9. The implicit survival rates κt and mortality rates (1 − κt) are set out in
table 10. Survival rates for the second age group (age 15 to 24) are lower by up to 30
percentage points if the epidemic breaks out, and mortality rates are at least 1.9 times
higher in the case of AIDS. At the peak of the epidemic, mortality rates are more than 3
times higher than their respective values in the case without AIDS during four consecutive
decades.
5.1 Preliminaries 22
Table 8: Projections: Population Tables without AIDS
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
0-4 4458 4696 4602 4503 4537 4398 4336 4336 4336
5-14 7182 9006 9550 8995 8965 8968 8715 8715 8715
15-24 4715 6875 8666 9236 8744 8759 8807 8601 8644
25-34 2979 4447 6526 8277 8878 8458 8525 8624 8475
35-44 1833 2731 4116 6098 7809 8454 8129 8269 8442
45-54 1099 1634 2463 3755 5628 7290 7982 7761 7982
55-64 698 911 1379 2115 3280 4998 6581 7323 7234
65+ 511 864 1294 1969 3131 5266 8395 8395 8395
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
Table 9: Projections: Population Tables with AIDS
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
0-4 4458 4556 3874 3436 3238 3038 2972 2972 2972
5-14 7182 8612 8416 7197 6578 6258 5971 5971 5971
15-24 4715 6839 8209 8040 6945 6429 6186 5902 5902
25-34 2979 4187 5780 6912 6997 6360 6182 5948 5676
35-44 1833 2410 3052 4136 5266 5873 5878 5713 5498
45-54 1099 1487 1760 2173 3125 4372 5352 5357 5207
55-64 698 906 1149 1361 1746 2666 3956 4843 4847
65+ 511 821 1087 1362 1693 2353 3657 3657 3657
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
Table 10: Survival rates κt and mortality rates (1− κt) in the benchmark cases
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
NO AIDS κt 0.827 0.844 0.862 0.881 0.899 0.918
AIDS κt 0.591 0.519 0.541 0.633 0.765 0.842
NO AIDS 1− κt 0.173 0.156 0.138 0.119 0.101 0.082
AIDS 1− κt 0.409 0.481 0.459 0.367 0.235 0.158
κt is the probability that an adult in age group a = 3 will survive 20 years, to reach age
group a = 5.
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N1t is derived endogenously in the present model, in contrast to the projections in ta-
bles 8 and 9. Yet the implicit survival probabilities underlying these tables are used to
compute the number of adults in each age group in future periods, and therefore new age
pyramids:
N1+it+i = N
1
t · (1− q1,1+it ), i ≥ 1 (17)
where q1,it is the probability that a member of age group 1 in period t will not survive to
become a member of age group 1+ i in period t+ i. Equation (17) enables the calculation
of the diagonals of the population table, namely, values for N2t+1, N
3
t+2, N
4
t+3, . . . , starting
with N1t , which is endogenous. Those values of the age pyramid which cannot be com-
puted using (17), for example N29 or N
4
11, are taken from table 9.
One last step is necessary before turning to the projections, namely, the determination
of N1min and N
1
max. As the number of school-going children depends on the number of
families, one must define N1min and N
1
max relative to family size. We choose N
1
min so as
to allow stationarity with respect to population size. As some children and adults always
die prematurely, even without an AIDS epidemic, the replacement fertility rate will lie
somewhat above 1. In the light of these data, N1min is set to
N1min = 1.05 ·
N2t +N
3
t
2
∀t
in every period t. Variations in N1min will be discussed in section 6.1. It turns out that the
value of N1max plays a minor role in all but one variation. Historically, the highest number
of children raised (a = 1) per family according to the above definition was 1.91 during
the 1980s. Therefore, we choose N1max slightly higher, so that 2N
1
t /(N
2
t +N
3
t ) ≤ 1.95 or
N1max = 1.95 ·
N2t +N
3
t
2
∀t.
This implies that, in a steady state, the total population can double within about 20 years
if all families choose N1t = N
1
max. We also assume that the number of children cannot drop
from N1max to N
1
min within one period. If the family’s optimum yields 2N
1
t /(N
2
t +N
3
t ) >
(1.95 + 1.05)/2 = 1.5 in some period t, then the minimum number of children in the
following period, t+1, is set to N1min = [1.05/2+N
1
t /(N
2
t +N
3
t )] · (N2t+1+N3t+1)/2 instead
of N1min = 1.05(N
2
t+1 +N
3
t+1)/2. Only in period t+ 2 does N
1
min take the restricted value
of N1min = 1.05(N
2
t+2 + N
3
t+2)/2. Consider, for example, t = 9, where 2N
1
9/(N
2
9 + N
3
9 ) =
1.87 > 1.5. This yields, in period t = 10 : N1min = [(1.05 + 1.87)/2] · (N210 + N310)/2 =
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1.46 · (N210 + N310)/2 instead of N1min = 1.05 · (N210 + N310)/2, that is, N1min is higher by
nearly 40%.
5.1.2 Procedure
For each year, the solution to the household maximization problem, that is, the optimal
values of N1t and et, is computed. Both interior solutions, i.e. solutions to (14), and a
total of 8 corner solutions are calculated in order to find the optimum, including interior
solutions with respect to only one variable, that is, solutions in which N1t is at the corner,
while et solves the corresponding first-order condition in (14), and vice versa. λt+1 and the
relevant values of the age pyramid are calculated using (4) and (17), and these values are
then used to determine the household optima for the following periods. The projections
are limited to 2040.
As noted before, Kenya abolished fees for primary education in 2003, which reduced
the costs of schooling by about half. This reduction came surprisingly, as part of a cam-
paign promise of a newly elected government, and it cannot be assumed that parents
anticipated it during the 1990s, that is, when they made and implemented their fertility
decisions. As a consequence, we will proceed as follows to determine the optimal levels of
e10 and N
1
10 : first, we determine e10 and N
1
10 assuming that σ10 = σ9. In a second step, we
assume that parents observe the abolishment of school fees and revise their decision on e10.
The following sections will discuss the results of the model simulations with the calibra-
tion in table 7 in detail. The summary of simulation outcomes with the other calibrations’
results are reported in tables 25 to 29 in the appendix.
5.2 The Benchmark Cases
5.2.1 The NO AIDS case
The results for the first benchmark case, that is, the scenario without an HIV/AIDS epi-
demic, are set out in table 11.
The variable yt denotes GDP per capita, and is computed from the last two columns. Total
population, measured in 1000s, is stated in the last column. WithN1min = 0.525(N
2
t +N
3
t ),
a value of 1.05 in the fourth column of the table indicates a corner solution with respect
to N1t . Similarly, a value of 1.46 for t = 10 also denotes a corner solution, as described
in section 5.1.1. In the first benchmark case, parents reduce fertility during the 1990s
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Table 11: Benchmark Case: NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8256 1.46 0.93 1242 3730 30023 26.13
11 6.97 8160 1.13 1.00 1530 5480 35814 26.44
12 8.17 10216 1.32 1.00 1641 7341 44746 26.78
13 9.51 12606 1.44 1.00 1787 9955 55701 27.56
14 11.02 15217 1.39 1.00 2005 13791 68772 28.46
sharply, from 1.87 children per family to 1.46 children a decade later. This has two rea-
sons: first, as school fees are abolished, the costs of education are reduced by half, so that
parents now increase education. Second, the productivity parameter αt drops by 19%,
from its 1990 value of 1357 to 1104 in 2000.17 As a consequence, raising children is now
relatively more expensive, the value of b remaining unchanged, and parents must reduce
N1t in order to be able to finance child-raising.
18 By 2010, all children start enjoying
full-time schooling, and parents find it worthwhile to invest in having more children once
again. As a consequence, N1t , t ≥ 11 all lie above N1min, while et = 1.0 ∀t ≥ 11.
5.2.2 Scenario 1: Revision of e9
The HIV/AIDS epidemic does not (measurably) change the adult population structure
for 1990, the first year of interest, as can be seen from tables 8 and 9. It does, however,
change the parents’ expectations, concerning both future mortality rates and population
pyramids. Fewer of them will survive to old age, so that consumption in that phase of
life becomes effectively less important than consumption while they are young, as the
weight attached to c2,t+2, β1κt, falls. The interior solution is N
1
9 = 4453 and e9 = 0.70,
that is, parents would like to reduce fertility and increase schooling compared to the NO
AIDS case, which, in turn would reduce income from child labor (4453 · (1 − 0.70) <
7182 · (1− 0.57)). However, school-children in the 1990s have already been born, so that
parents cannot choose N19 as they wish. They can, however, revise their choice of e9
downwards, which yields e9 = 0.42. Total GDP in 1990 is slightly higher than in the NO
AIDS case, due to the increase in child labor. After 1990, the level of schooling grows,
albeit slowly. Child labor disappears by 2020, a full decade later that in the NO AIDS
17The fact that the size of the labor force has also increased reduces the labor productivity – and
therefore increases the relative child-raising costs – by another 4%.
18Note that this result would not hold if the child-raising costs were defined as N1t bλt · αt/
∑6
a=2N
a
t
rather than N1t bλt.
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case. In the first benchmark case, GDP grows, on average, by 3% annually between 1990
and 2040, and by only 1.7% annually in the AIDS scenario. Total GDP in the NO AIDS
case is higher by 90% than in the AIDS case for 2040. Population is always lower with
the epidemic, by 40% in 2040. It grows by 2.2% annually on average in the NO AIDS
case over the period 1990 – 2040, and by only half that rate in the AIDS case. Compared
to the US Bureau’s projections in tables 8 and 9, total population in 2040 as predicted by
the present model is higher by 22% in the NO AIDS case and by 11% in the AIDS case.
Per capita GDP falls between 1990 and 2000 in the NO AIDS benchmark case, due to the
Table 12: Scenario 1: AIDS, Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.57 1186 3434 28944 21.91
11 5.26 7058 1.05 0.91 1352 4163 30799 22.17
12 6.47 6928 1.05 1.00 1484 4817 32464 23.36
13 7.60 7829 1.25 1.00 1583 5655 35717 25.33
14 8.94 9186 1.33 1.00 1754 7268 41445 26.98
drop in αt in 2000. After this initial reduction of about 5%, per capita GDP grows in all
decades thereafter; however, the growth rate is low – only 1.2% annually, on average. In
the AIDS case, yt is higher in 1990 compared to the NO AIDS case, by about 1%. This
is due to the fact that children work more. Per capita GDP falls between 1990 and 2000,
and the drop is twice as large as in the NO AIDS case. yt grows slowly after 2010, and,
by 2010, GDP per capita in the AIDS case is no greater than its level in the NO AIDS
case. By 2040, per capita GDP in the AIDS case is 12% lower than it would have been if
the epidemic had not broken out.
5.2.3 Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
If households do not realize the outbreak of the epidemic until the late 1990s, they cannot
revise their decisions about education, so that eScenario 29 = e
NOAIDS
9 = 0.57. Consequently,
λ10 is higher than in Scenario 1 (5.67 > 4.97), which has two effects: first, households
can produce more, and are therefore richer. Second, education is more profitable, as
z10(N
2
10λ10 + N
3
10λ9)/(N
2
10 + N
3
10) is higher.
19 As a consequence, parents can now invest
more in education, so that et is somewhat higher in scenario 2 in all periods, and full-time
19Note that N210, N
3
10 as well as λ9 and z10 are identical in both scenarios, so that the size of term above
is determined by λ10 alone.
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Table 13: Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.59 1255 3634 28944 22.05
11 5.69 7058 1.05 1.00 1446 4452 30799 22.38
12 7.38 6928 1.05 1.00 1632 5299 32464 23.64
13 8.35 8034 1.28 1.00 1735 6251 36023 25.65
14 9.87 9400 1.35 1.00 1939 8135 41964 27.33
schooling is attained earlier than in the first scenario. Parents being wealthier (higher
λt), they can also invest more in fertility after 2020, that is, when mortality rates fall. All
variables are higher in the second scenario compared to the first (Population by about
1%, GDP by 12%, and GDP per capita and human capital by 10%), but still lower than
in the NO AIDS case (Population by 39%, GDP by 41%, GDP per capita by 3%, human
capital by 10%).
Therefore, from both an individual20 and an aggregate point of view, scenario 2 yields
better results, with a weaker impact of the epidemic, than the first scenario, in which
parents revise their decisions about schooling during the 1990s.
6 Variations: Parameters
To test how sensitive the results derived above are to the assumptions made, some varia-
tions in the latter will now be presented. The variations will concern the choice of N1min,
and alternative paths for {σt}t=9,10,..., {αt}t=9,10,... and {zt}t=9,10,.... In all variations, it will
be assumed that parents perfectly foresee all future changes in parameters, even if they
do not immediately foresee the course of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
6.1 Variation 1: The level of N 1min
The first major assumption concerned the minimum number of children parents can choose
to have, which was set by the condition N1min = 1.05 · (N2t +N3t )/2. As a variation, N1min
is increased slightly, to N1min = 1.1 · (N2t + N3t )/2. The results can be found in table 14.
In the NO AIDS case, parents now raise more children than in the benchmark case in all
20The expected levels of utility are also higher in all periods in the second scenario compared to the
first.
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Table 14: Variation 1: The level of N1min
NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8398 1.48 0.91 1235 3734 30239 26.13
11 6.90 8274 1.13 1.00 1520 5492 36119 26.44
12 8.13 10250 1.30 1.00 1637 7372 45038 26.76
13 9.45 12699 1.44 1.00 1777 9970 56102 27.53
14 10.96 15325 1.39 1.00 1994 13809 69272 28.44
AIDS, scenario 1: Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8178 1.48 0.56 1179 3437 29155 21.91
11 5.21 7467 1.10 0.86 1327 4183 31527 22.16
12 6.28 7533 1.10 1.00 1437 4864 33859 23.34
13 7.48 8001 1.19 1.00 1574 5823 36982 25.29
14 8.77 9444 1.30 1.00 1730 7418 42887 26.84
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8178 1.48 0.58 1248 3638 29155 22.04
11 5.63 7467 1.10 0.94 1418 4472 31527 22.37
12 7.15 7533 1.10 1.00 1580 5349 33859 23.62
13 8.21 8216 1.22 1.00 1724 6431 37302 25.61
14 9.67 9671 1.32 1.00 1909 8292 43434 27.20
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years but 1990, but they invest less in schooling; so that the level of efficiency of young
adults is somewhat lower in all periods, as is per capita GDP. In 2000, parents choose the
minimal level of fertility, and invest in education. By 2010, when children go to school
full-time, parents start again to have more children. Total population and GDP are higher
in all periods from 2000 onwards, but the difference is small, reaching 0.7% in 2040. The
difference in GDP is even smaller, amounting to less than 0.2%.
In the first scenario, wherein parents reconsider their earlier decisions about e9 when learn-
ing about HIV/AIDS, the new value for e9 chosen remains unchanged, being independent
of N1min. Compared to the reference case, parents now have more, but worse-educated
children until 2020 (see tables 13 and 14), and per capita GDP is lower in all periods.
The impact of the epidemic on λt and yt is stronger than in the case where the N
1
min−
factor is 1.05, as parents can less afford to educate their more numerous children. Its
impact on GDP and population, however, is weaker, as parents do not reduce fertility as
much when the epidemic breaks out, so that population and GDP do not fall as sharply
as in the reference case.
In the second scenario, that is, in the case of delayed expectations, GDP and popula-
tion are higher than in the reference case (Table 13), as parents have more children from
2000 until 2010. They invest less in education, so that et, λt and per capita GDP lie below
their respective reference values. The effects of the epidemic on GDP and Population,
however, are weaker than in the reference case.
6.2 Variation 2: The level of σt
The households’ decisions on schooling are strongly influenced by the costs of education,
σt, which were reduced during the 2000s as school fees were abolished. This led to an
increase in education, which might have countervailed the effects of the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic. To disentangle the effects from these two shocks, we will now simulate the house-
hold’s decisions if school fees had not been abolished. The results are reported in table 15.
In all cases, it takes at least one decade longer to eradicate child labor. The effects
are arguably strongest in the first scenario, in which child labor is still present in 2040.
When the epidemic breaks out, parents now reduce education much more sharply than
they did in the benchmark case: for example, e10 ≈ 0.38 in both scenarios, compared to
e10 ≈ 0.6 in the reference cases, which means that children work 50% more. The effects
of the epidemic on human capital and GDP per capita are therefore stronger than in the
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reference case. For example, in the first scenario, 2040 human capital is lower by about
19% than in the NO AIDS case if school fees are ablosihed, and by 43% if they are not.
With schooling being more expensive, parents now prefer to invest in having more chil-
dren when mortality rates are high. Consequently, population size is higher than in the
respective reference cases from 2010 onwards, while the effects of the epidemic on total
population are somewhat weaker (see tables 25 and 27).
The reduction of schooling costs contributed strongly to mitigating the effects of the
epidemic on all measures but population. Note, however, than an underlying assump-
tion is that, while school fees were abolished, school quality (i.e. zt) remains unchanged.
Schools have to instruct many more pupils,21 and loose one important source of funding.
Governmental spending on primary education as a share of GDP did not change much
either – it actually fell from 7.17% in 2002 to 6.98% in 2003.22 Measured in local currency
units, however, public spending on primary education rose sharply from 3322 Million Khs
in 2002/2003 to 5967 Million Khs in 2003/2004 - a rise of nearly 80%.23 To sum up, the
assumption that quality of education was unaffected by the abolition of school fees might
not hold, and one could expect zt to have been lower than its calibrated value at least
temporatily. However, no data are available allowing us to recalibrate zt, and the change
in the pupil/teacher-ratio as one measure of school quality suggest that it did not change
much.
6.3 Variation 3: The level of αt
The labor productivity factor αt dropped by 19% in the decade following 1990, from 1357
to 1104, and this reduction is the main reason for the households’ decision to reduce fer-
tility from 2000 onwards, even in the absence of the disease – see section 5.2. Assume that
αt recovers after the sharp drop in the 1990s, to some value between α10 and α9. To be
precise, let productivity take the value αt = 0.5(α9 + α10) after 2000. As in the previous
section, it will be assumed that parents foresee changes in αt perfectly. The results are
set out in table 16.
21According to World Bank Data (WDI 2006), the number of children enrolled in primary education
increased by 900000, or 18%, between 2002 and 2003, while the number of teachers increased by 7%. This
implies that each teacher had to tutor about 3.5 additional students, on average.
22Source: Worldbank, WDI 2006
23Source: Kenya Ministry of Education, http://www.education.go.ke/Statistics/EducationExpenditure.pdf,
as of Sept. 22, 2006. The data in the text refers to ’recurring costs’. If development costs are inluded,
the rise amounts to nearly 190%.
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Table 15: Variation 2: The level of σt
NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8256 1.46 0.59 1263 3793 30023 26.03
11 5.69 8662 1.20 0.88 1393 5091 36559 26.05
12 6.96 9413 1.18 1.00 1522 6701 44027 26.34
13 8.14 11294 1.31 1.00 1610 8600 53410 26.91
14 9.52 13317 1.34 1.00 1769 11386 64347 27.83
AIDS, scenario 1: Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.37 1199 3471 28944 21.85
11 4.37 7058 1.05 0.54 1279 3939 30799 21.91
12 4.74 7597 1.15 0.62 1245 4166 33453 22.79
13 4.98 9331 1.41 0.67 1176 4540 38604 24.42
14 5.41 10056 1.27 0.81 1226 5494 44798 25.67
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.38 1269 3673 28944 21.98
11 4.70 7058 1.05 0.59 1365 4204 30799 22.11
12 5.35 6928 1.05 0.74 1392 4520 32464 23.05
13 5.83 8281 1.32 0.85 1351 4916 36392 24.75
14 6.77 8781 1.24 1.00 1464 6043 41285 26.23
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In the NO AIDS case in 2000, parents would like most to have very few children (as
raising them is relatively costly when αt is low) but to educate these children very well,
as future pay-offs from schooling are higher, with αt expected to rise after 2000. However,
due to the social rule on N1min each family in 2000 must raise at least 1.46 children, and
therefore cannot afford to educate much them above ebase case10 = 0.93. Thus, the changes in
αt do not lead to an increase in either N
1
10 or e10, as one might expect. By 2010, however,
when αt has recovered substantially, the relative costs incurred in raising children are
lower, and parents have more children than in the case of a low level of αt for t > 10. In
all periods following 2010, both total and per capita GDP values are higher than in the
benchmark case as αt is higher.
Human capital levels are equal until at least 2010, and the levels in the variation exceed
the levels in the benchmark case after that. Recall that the productivity of education de-
pends on the teachers’/parents’ average level of human capital, (N2t λt+N
3
t λt)/(N
2
t +N
3
t ).
If there are relatively more young (well-educated) adults in age group a = 2, then the term
above will grow, and education will be relatively more productive. Therefore, if parents
have more children, and if these children enjoy the same education in both the variation
and the benchmark case, the level of human capital of individuals leaving school 2 decades
later will be higher. In the present case, N111 = 9996 in the variation and N
1
11 = 7058 in
the benchmark case. These children finish schooling by 2020, when they become parents
themselves, and start teaching N112. This cohort, in turn, finishes school by 2030, and their
level of human capital is higher in the variation than in the benchmark case 9.58 > 9.51.
This effect can also be observed in the second scenario for λ14.
As a consequence of the increased investment in fertility, total population is now much
higher than in all other cases reported, and exceeds the 2040 values projected by the US
Bureau of the Census by about 50% and, respectively, 30% in the NO AIDS and AIDS
cases. The effects of the epidemic are somewhat stronger than in the benchmark case (see
tables 25 and 28), with the differences amounting to max. 4 percentage points.
6.4 Variation 3: The level of zt
As the adults’ choice of et is driven, at least in part, by zt, the last variation presented will
address the development of the transmission factor after 2000. Assume that zt recovers
after 1990, and, following Bell et al. (2004), set its value to zt = 0.65 ∀t ≥ 10. If parents
perfectly foresee this change in the productivity of education, they will raise the level of
6.4 Variation 3: The level of zt 33
Table 16: Variation 3: Recovery of αt after 2000
.
NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.61
10 5.67 8256 1.46 0.93 1242 3730 30023 26.28
11 6.97 9996 1.38 1.00 1585 6107 38535 26.91
12 8.17 13000 1.51 1.00 1729 8768 50701 27.46
13 9.58 16327 1.49 1.00 1932 12695 65718 28.13
14 11.08 20878 1.48 1.00 2168 18446 85089 28.74
AIDS, scenario 1: Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.45
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.57 1186 3434 28944 22.00
11 5.26 7058 1.05 1.00 1501 4623 30799 22.55
12 6.76 7555 1.15 1.00 1634 5457 33390 23.82
13 7.77 9785 1.49 1.00 1688 6624 39241 25.92
14 9.21 11788 1.45 1.00 1925 9196 47777 27.51
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.61
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.59 1255 3634 28944 22.14
11 5.69 7058 1.05 1.00 1611 4962 30799 22.76
12 7.38 7508 1.14 1.00 1772 5905 33320 24.05
13 8.35 9992 1.52 1.00 1812 7160 39504 26.17
14 9.89 12102 1.48 1.00 2069 10017 48404 27.80
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schooling children enjoy during the 1990s, even though z9 takes a low value; for young
adults take into account the education of several future generations when making their
decisions, and investing in et early is profitable. Therefore, if there is perfect foresight
concerning zt, the results for 1990 will differ from the data. This issue can be solved by
assuming either that zt recovers only later, that is, by 2010, or that parents do not take
note of the changes in zt until they actually take place. To keep matters simple, assume
that zt recovers only late, in 2010, that is: z9 = z10 and zt≥11 = 0.65.
Table 17: Variation 4: Recovery of zt by 2010
NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8256 1.46 0.95 1242 3727 30023 26.20
11 7.02 8606 1.19 1.00 1506 5495 36475 26.61
12 9.33 9532 1.20 1.00 1782 7869 44152 27.11
13 11.70 11345 1.31 1.00 2057 11015 53551 27.96
14 14.78 13329 1.33 1.00 2468 15913 64479 29.16
AIDS, scenario 1: Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.58 1186 3433 28944 21.96
11 5.29 7058 1.05 1.00 1350 4158 30799 22.27
12 7.70 6928 1.05 1.00 1590 5162 32464 23.64
13 9.48 7266 1.16 1.00 1853 6461 34876 25.86
14 12.24 8121 1.23 1.00 2222 8735 39313 27.72
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.60 1255 3633 28944 22.10
11 5.72 7058 1.05 1.00 1449 4462 30799 22.48
12 8.41 6928 1.05 1.00 1722 5592 32464 23.87
13 10.22 7402 1.18 1.00 1998 7010 35080 26.12
14 13.19 8303 1.24 1.00 2403 9543 39717 28.00
By construction, the results for 1990 remain unchanged compared to the benchmark cases,
as z11 does not appear in the household’s maximization problem when it chooses N
1
9 and
35
e9. By 2000, however, parents start taking into account future changes in zt, and increase
education accordingly. Consequently, the adult level of efficiency in 2040 is higher by
34%, while per capita and total GDP are higher by 23% and 15%, respectively compared
to the benchmark NO AIDS case.
As expected, the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are slightly weaker than in the case
where zt does not change, as parents invest heavily in education even in the presence of the
epidemic. Despite the outbreak of the disease, per capita GDP in 2040 when zt≥11 = 0.65
is higher than in the NO AIDS benchmark case (see table 11), and the difference amounts
to about 10-20%. Child labor is now eradicated by 2010 even if parents revise their earlier
decisions about e9.
7 Policy
Governmental intervention has been necessary, since the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic in Africa in the 1980s, particularly in the health and education sectors, in order to
mitigate its adverse effects. Individuals in developing countries do not have the resources
to learn unaided about how the disease is transmitted, and cannot afford the treatment if
they become infected. With the number of AIDS orphans estimated to have risen by 30%
between 2001 and 2003 alone,24 communities which have taken in orphans in the past are
increasingly overwhelmed.
Governmental programs can therefore be classified into three types of measures: prevent-
ing the disease from spreading, treating and caring for the ill, and looking after orphans.
Preventive measures encompass information campaigns in the media and schools, the dis-
tribution of condoms and setting up AIDS test facilities in all affected regions. Before the
epidemic breaks out fully, the number of HIV infections typically rises in certain popula-
tion groups like prostitutes and truck drivers – targeting preventive campaigns at these
groups can prove to be highly effective.
After the epidemic breaks out, however, the economy must bear the combined burden
of a workforce reduced by illness and death, and the costs of caring for the sick and their
families. At this stage, public policies aim at extending the life of the infected through
treatment and preventing them from spreading the disease to the healthy. While informa-
tion campaigns in the media and schools remain important, measures now also consist of
24Source: ‘Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2004,’ U.N.AIDS, 2004, Page 193
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treating HIV-positive pregnant women with drugs to reduce the likelihood of the unborn
child also being infected at delivery. With a prevalence rate among Kenyan adults aged
15-49 of 6.7% in 2003,25 that is, more than 1 million AIDS cases to follow, the medical
infrastracture needs to be extended, by building additional hospitals and clinics, as well
as training and employing more health personnel.
Preventive measures such as information campaigns and condom distribution are relatively
cheap – particularly so before a full outbreak of the epidemic, when it is often sufficient to
target focus groups. Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn (2002) estimate the costs of preven-
tion at about 8-12 US$ per case averted. Saving one disability-adjusted-life-year (DALY)
through a bundle of measures such as prevention of mother-to-child transmission, supply
of condoms for sex workers, control of sexually-transmitted diseases, voluntary counseling
and testing as well as blood supply safety, costs an estimated US$12.50. Treatment costs,
for example through highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) are much higher: in
the developed world, they exceed 10,000 US$ per patient per year. With the emergence
of generic drugs, which are intended for distribution in developing countries only, drug
costs amount to 350 US$ per patient per year. Note, however, that these costs do not
include distributing the drugs and payments for medical personnel. As a consequence,
Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn estimate the costs of saving a DALY for a cost-effective
HAART program to be 395 US$ per patient yearly.
7.1 Procedure
Intervention in the health sector will aim at reducing mortality rates, both through pre-
venting AIDS from spreading and by treating those who are already ill. In the initial
phase of the epidemic, intervention will consist mainly of cost-effective preventive mea-
sures. Treatment will gain importance when preventive measures do not bear fruit any
more. Denote public spending on health in period t, normalized per sub-family, by Gt,
and mortality rates in the presence of the disease (D = 1) by qt(D = 1). Following Bell
et al. (2004), assume the relationship between premature adult mortality in the presence
of the disease and public spending on health to be as follows:
1− κt(Gt;D = 1) ≡ qt(Gt;D = 1) = dt − 1
at + cte−btGt
, (18)
which allows for sufficient curvature (diminishing returns) over a flexible interval. The
values of at, bt, ct and dt need to be calibrated for each period in which Gt > 0. As the
25Source: ‘Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2004,’ U.N.AIDS, 2004, Page 191
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present essay uses the same data as Bell et al. (2004), the results derived there remain
valid for present purposes.26 Due to the changes in mortality rates, the population tables
Table 18: The parameter values of the function qt(Gt;D = 1)
2000 2010 2020
at 0.9073 0.9863 1.3852
bt 0.0169 0.0187 0.0266
ct 0.3124 0.3395 0.4768
dt 1.2152 1.1128 0.8066
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
need to be recalculated using (18) and table 18. To be able to compute the new values of
Nat , the public spending program needs to be defined and the age-specific mortality rates
qa,a+1t , must be formulated as a function of qt(Gt;D = 1). For reasons of comparability,
the same functional form as in Bell et al. (2004) is chosen. Following Bell et al. (2004),
Gt, i.e. the level of spending per family, is defined as:
Gt ≡ Pt
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )/2
, (19)
with Pt being the level of governmental spending on health. Consider the 30-year spending
program:
P = (P2000, P2010, P2020) = (50 · 106, 100 · 106, 100 · 106),
where P2000 = 50·106 means that 50 million dollars are spent on health every year between
2000 and 2009, and P2010 and P2020 can be interpreted analogously. Assume that the pro-
gram P is financed through grants from abroad, which are fully funded by international
donors. As the grants do not need to be repaid, levying taxes or reshuﬄing the govern-
mental budget to finance them is not necessary. It is also assumed that the government
has no means to extend the program beyond the donors’ grants.
The age-specific mortality rates are then defined as follows:
qa,a+1t (Gt;D = 1) = q
a,a+1
t ·
(
1− qt(Gt;D = 1)
qt(0;D = 1)
)
(20)
As a consequence of the policy program P, the number of children raised by a family
and surviving to old age will now change, and the size of Gt is endogenous because as
26Source: Bell et al. (2004), page 47
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Nat is endogenous. Therefore, the population tables need to be recomputed in each period.
Parental decisions are determined in part by their expectations about future mortality
rates. In the absence of public spending, parents were assumed to have perfect foresight
about mortality rates. To keep matters simple in the case of governmental spending on
health, assume parents are more short-sighted: They are aware of the mortality structure
if the governmental spending did not take place, and of all future effects of the spend-
ing program. However, they do not take into account the effects their own decisions on
N1t will have on future values of Gt. Hence, the subjective estimates of κt and κt+1 are
computed as follows: The current population tables and mortality rates are taken as a
basis to calculate Gt from (19) and the new mortality rates q
a,a+1
t (Gt;D = 1), from (18)
and (20), which, in turn, are used to compute new values for Nat from (17) and hence
κt and κt+1. All values of N
a
t which are not influenced by the policy program P are left
unchanged.
7.2 Policy: Results
As the policy program P does not affect the NO AIDS case, only the results for the AIDS
scenarios are reported. Taking into account the history of policies to deal with AIDS in
Kenya, it seems unlikely that households in the 1990s could have foreseen that a program
would be implemented in the 2000s. Due to the nature of HIV/AIDS, the effects of such
a program on mortality will not make themselves felt immediately, so that it will be as-
sumed that, first, parents during the 1990s do not foresee the program, and second, that
even during the 2000s they do not realize its effects, and therefore do not revise their
decisions about e10. Young adults in t = 10, however, who decide about N
1
11 and e11,
realize the programs’ effects and make their decisions accordingly. Therefore, even if the
government intervenes in the health sector, the outcomes for t = 9 and t = 10 regarding
fertility and schooling will remain unchanged. The results are set out in tables 30 to 34
in the appendix. The direct effects of the policy program on the families’ decisions can
be observed for 2010, that is, the first year in which they react to changes in mortality.
Table 19 sets out the adult’s level of efficiency in 2010 as well as the qualitative changes in
fertility and education: a ”+” in the third column states that fertility is higher compared
to the case without public spending, a ”–” denotes that fertility is lower, and a ”0”means
that it remains unchanged. The symbols in the last column are interpreted analogously.
As a consequence of the policy program P, mortality rates are reduced, so that more
39
Table 19: The effects of the policy program P on fertility and education: 2010
λt
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et
Base Case
Scenario 1 5.26 0 +
Scenario 2 5.69 0 0
Variation 1 (N1min)
Scenario 1 5.21 0 +
Scenario 2 5.63 0 +
Variation 2 (σt≥10)
Scenario 1 4.37 0 +
Scenario 2 4.70 0 +
Variation 3 (αt≥10)
Scenario 1 5.26 + 0
Scenario 2 5.69 + 0
Variation 4 (zt≥11)
Scenario 1 5.29 0 0
Scenario 2 5.72 0 0
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
of the parents will survive to old age. At the same time, more of their children will sur-
vive to adulthood and be able to finance their parents in old age. Therefore, consumption
in the second stage of adulthood becomes more important in all calculations. To finance
it, parents can invest either in education, or in fertility, or in both. Recall that, in most
variations and scenarios, parents already choose full-time schooling by 2010. In all cases
in which eG=011 < 1, parents increase schooling when the policy program is undertaken.
Fertility is increased in one case only, namley, if αt recovers, which also implies a reduc-
tion of the relative child-raising costs. The overall effects of the program on λt, yt, Yt and
population will be discussed in detail in section 9.
8 The Effects on Social Welfare
In order to assess the overall effects of the epidemic and the policy program P, a social
welfare function (SWF) is required. The choice of a SWF, however, poses difficulties of
its own. It has to capture and value several effects of the epidemic: first, some individuals
die prematurely, and are robbed of the opportunity to enjoy their lives and be productive.
40
Second, some individuals are never born, either because their parents die prematurely or
because their parents decide to have fewer children. Third, even those individuals who do
not die prematurely often enjoy less schooling than they would have done in the absence
of the disease, so that their lifetime income is reduced and their parents’ utility from the
capacity they attain as adults will fall. There is very little literature on the evolution of
welfare when fertility is endogenous. Schweizer (1996) considers an open economy and
defines efficiency using the concept of net trade. His welfare measure, however, holds only
for economies in a steady state, where population growth is constant over time. As this is
not the case in our projections, the measure developed by Schweizer cannot be employed
in our framework.
The first step is to decide what unit – monetary or physical – to use. As one of the
reasons for introducing a social welfare function is to assess the effects and profitabil-
ity of the policy program P, and as the costs of this program are measured in dol-
lars, we will choose a money-metric measure. In general, changes to an individual’s
level of utility are valued using the concepts of the compensating or equivalent variation
(CV and EV), as these capture all individual-level effects described above and assign
them a monetary value. The CV measures how much money, in the form of a lump-
sum transfer, is required such that and individual’s level of utility in the AIDS case
with the lump-sum transfer be identical to her level of utility in the NO AIDS case:
U(NO AIDS; ·) = U(AIDS,CV > 0; ·). The EV is the lump-sum an individual is will-
ing to pay in order to avoid the changes in mortality brought about by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic and its consequences: U(NO AIDS,EV < 0; ·) = U(AIDS; ·). The CV and
EV measure the effects on individuals. By summing the CV and EV over all relevant
individuals27 in some periods, it is possible to assess the overall losses and gains due to
the epidemic or an intervention. This aggregation, however, does not include those indi-
viduals who are never born, but would have been under other circumstances. The CV and
EV can be defined in an analogous way to compute the effects of the policy intervention.
The transfer can be paid or received either in period t, that is, while the children are
going to school, or in period t + 2, that is, when the parents reach old age, or in both
periods. Note, first, that even though the transfers are lump-sum in form, parents will
change N1t and/or et. Consider, for example, a family receiving a lump-sum transfer Tt in
27Aggregating the EV h over all individuals h rests on the assumption that the marginal utility of income
is the same for all individuals. This assumption is easily satisfied within a period, as all individuals are
identical. However, the marginal utility of income will be identical between two periods by pure chance
only.
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period t, and nothing in period t+2. As there are no capital markets, individuals cannot
smooth consumption by saving, and therefore they will change their choice of fertility,
schooling or both.28 It is not possible to determine et and N
1
t analytically as functions of
the transfer, so that the values of the functions U(AIDS,CV ; ·) and U(NO AIDS,EV ; ·)
must be determined numerically. In fact, the CV and EV can only be derived using grid
search methods,29 which are computationally expensive, as they have to be done sepa-
rately for each period, variation and scenario.
Note, also, that the CV and EV are likely to differ significantly, as the changes in mortal-
ity incurred when the epidemic breaks out are large. The difference stems from the fact
that it is not only the the levels of consumption which change, but also the weights of
the subutility functions. When computing the CV, we consider the AIDS utility function,
when computing the EV, the NO AIDS one. These differ, for instance, in the weight
attached to old-age consumption, β1κt, which is much lower in the case of the CV. Hence,
the CV will generally be much larger than the EV as mortality rates rise, and vice-versa.
The EV and CV being hard to compute, we will now turn to other, simpler, measures of
welfare. One such measure is income, summed over all relevant individuals and periods.
While income measures, to some extent, the utility which accrues to households through
its close connection to consumption, it does not measure the utility that arises from the
educational attainment of the individual’s children (i.e. altruism), and it does not fully
measure the disutility arising from premature mortality. The contribution of the altruism
term to an individual’s level of utility is less than 2% in all years, scenarios and variations
analyzed; consumption, especially its distribution over time, and the parents’ expectations
about mortality determine the rest. Therefore, the major drawback of using income as
a measure of welfare is that is does not fully capture the losses and gains arising from
changes in mortality rates. If these changes are small, income can be used as an easy to
compute measure of welfare.
28This argument also holds if parents receive the transfer when they are old, as borrowing is not
possible. While it is possible that there will exist a tuple of transfers Tt, Tt+2 for which fertility and
schooling both remain unchanged, it is very unlikely that these transfers will correspond to a CV or EV
29The procedure, in the case of the EV, is as follows: First, compute the levels of utility attained in
the AIDS case. Second, use the NO AIDS utility function to calculate the optimal levels of fertility and
education for each transfer T, and the ensuing level of utility. Third, choose that level of T for which
utility in the NO AIDS case with the transfer is equal to the level of utility in the AIDS case without the
transfer. Steps two and three must be done separately for every year. The procedure in the case of the
CV is similar. Both the EV and CV can be calculated analogously when evaluating the policy program
P.
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The results, however, require careful interpretation, for they depend on whether per
capita or total income (GDP) is used. Total income can rise in two ways: either the
number of individuals rises, while income per head is constant, or the income of each
individual rises while the number of individuals remains constant. If parents decide to
reduce schooling while increasing fertility, per capita income will be lower – suggesting
that individuals might be worse off – while total income might rise – suggesting that an
economy-wide indicator has improved. If such a tradeoff does not exist, as is the case
when the HIV/AIDS epidemic first breaks out,30 both income per capita and total GDP
are arguably acceptable measures of welfare. In the case of the policy program P, how-
ever, such tradeoffs are frequent, in some cases per capita GDP falls while total GDP
(and population) rise. Therefore, when per capita GDP is the measure of welfare, the
policy program seems to have negative consequences. If total GDP is used instead, the
program has positive consequences. Which measure, then, is better? Note that when the
extended lifetime under the program is taken into consideration, the apparent negative
effect of the program measured using per capita GDP dissapears. Consequently, both per
capita income and total income can be used to measure the welfare losses incurred when
the HIV/AIDS epidemic breaks out and the gains from the program.
One last aspect needs to be discussed, namely, the treatment of those individuals who
are born under one program but not under another. The valuation of such individuals
and their lives is the issue of a lively discussion in both philosophy and economics, and
there is no commonly accepted method or procedure. Most authors who are concerned
with AIDS, for instance, Young (2005), do not take such individuals into account. Note
that whatever individual measure of welfare is chosen – CV, EV or per capita income – it
has to be summed up over all households/individuals who experience the losses and gains
in order to capture the full effects to be analyzed. Consider, for instance, the effects of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. When only those individuals who actually lived at some point
of time are considered, the losses are underestimated: if there had been no epidemic,
parents would have had more and better-educated children, whose hypothetical income
and lives involve losses which need to be taken into account when measuring the effects
of HIV/AIDS.
In the present paper, we need to estimate the effects of the HIV/ADS epidemic in the ab-
30Both per capita and total GDP are higher in the NO AIDS case compared to either AIDS scenario.
The single exception is the period t = 10, in which per capita GDP in the presence of the disease is
somewhat higher than in its absence due to a rise in child labor. As the difference amounts to less than
1% in all cases, we will ignore this problem for the rest of the welfare analysis.
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sence of the intervention, when there is no tradeoff, and the effects of the policy program
P, when there is. Two measures of welfare will be employed, both of them based on indi-
vidual incomes: first, a measure in which unborn individuals are taken into account, and
second, one in which they are not. To compute the first measure, we calculate the income,
in every period, of every individual alive in that period in the presence of the intervention
or shock, and compare it to the total income of every individual in the absence of the in-
tervention/shock. As the income of all individuals in some period is simply the total GDP
of that period, the first method compares GDP levels. As argued before, this method is
more appropriate when there is no tradeoff between schooling and fertility, that is, when
comparing the NO AIDS and AIDS cases. To compute the second measure, we calculate
the number of people who have died prematurely, or will do so, because of HIV/AIDS (or,
respectively, who would have died if there had been no policy intervention), and assess
their lost earnings. This step is somewhat more complicated than computing premature
deaths. The simplest way of doing it is to assume that, even if the mortality rates had
been different, these individuals would have enjoyed the same education, so that their
level of human capital would remain unchanged. In this case, their lost earnings would
be αtλ
a for each adult in each decade, where λa denotes her level of human capital. It is
also possible, however, that the individual would have enjoyed more schooling, and hence
a higher level of human capital, if mortality rates had been lower, and vice versa. As it is
not possible to compute this hypothetical level of schooling, we will simply assume that λt
and et take the same value as in the case without the HIV/AIDS mortality shock or the
governmental intervention, as appropriate. Therefore, when computing the (monetary)
losses, we will make two assumptions:
(A1) The fact that some potential children will never be born as a consequence of HIV/AIDS
will be ignored
(A2) The level of human capital attained by all children will be either
(A2a) the same level as in the case where the shock/intervention takes place.
(A2b) the same level as in the case where the shock/intervention does not takes place
For all measures employed, we compute the 1990 net present value (NPV) of all losses
and gains, and compare it either to the 1990 NPV of total, NO AIDS GDP, or to the 1990
NPV of the cost of the policy intervention P, to assess the effects of the epidemic or the
social profitability of the policy program. In all cases, the calculations are limited to the
years 1990 to 2040, so that gains and losses which accrue after 2040 are not included.
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9 Results
The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the policy program P are discussed in sections
9.1 and 9.2 respectively. We will first present changes in some basic measures of welfare,
namely, the adults’ level of human capital, λt, per capita income, yt, total GDP, Yt and
population in the last period of the projections (t = 14). Second, we will determine the
overall effects of the epidemic and the intervention using the procedures described above.
9.1 No public spending on health
The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the Kenyan people and economy are substan-
tial, but they also depend on the way households react. The average31 levels of several
simple measures of welfare as a percentage of their respective NO AIDS levels for the year
2040 are set out in tables 25 – 29 in the appendix, as well as in table 20 below. Figure
2 contains the levels of three measures relative to their NO AIDS levels, for all calibra-
tions. While λ and y describe welfare at the individual level, GDP and population are
aggregate measures. The effects of the epidemic on λ, per capita GDP and total GDP are
strongest in the case where e9 is revised in 1990, that is, in the first scenario. The impact
of HIV/AIDS on GDP is a heavy one: it is lower by at least 34% in all cases, and up
to 55% in the second variation. The effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on human capital
and per capita GDP is by far strongest in the second variation, in which it is assumed
that school fees are not abolished. In that case, parents reduce education sharply as the
epidemic breaks out, and child labor persists at least until 2030. This variation is also
the only case in which the effects of the epidemic on 2040 population are stronger in the
second scenario compared to the first. With education being very expensive, and parents
being comparatively poor in the first scenario, they prefer to invest in fertility (as opposed
to schooling). As a consequence, total population is not reduced by as much in the first
scenario as it is in the second, in which fertility is always lower, and education higher.
In the light of the results above, it is obvious that the abolition of school fees strongly
mitigated the effects of the epidemic on all welfare measures, with the exception of total
population, in both scenarios. The results of the other variations depart only slightly
from those of the benchmark cases, with the differences amounting to no more than 4
percentage points, compared to 4 – 23 percentage points in the second variation.
The overall effects of the epidemic are set out in tables 21 and 22. Table 21 gives the 1990
31The levels reported in the tables refer to average effects for all 27 calibrations
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Figure 2: The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic expressed as a % of the NO AIDS levels,
all calibrations
The bars denote the maximum/minimum values the ratio can take over all calibrations.
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Table 20: The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic expressed as a % of the NO AIDS levels
in 2040. Average Values
λ GDP per cap.
y
GDP Y Population
Base Case
Scenario 1 81 88 53 60
Scenario 2 89 96 59 61
Variation 1 (N1min)
Scenario 1 80 87 54 62
Scenario 2 88 96 60 63
Variation 2 (σt≥10)
Scenario 1 58 70 49 70
Scenario 2 72 83 54 64
Variation 3 (αt≥10)
Scenario 1 83 89 50 57
Scenario 2 89 96 55 57
Variation 4 (zt≥11)
Scenario 1 82 90 55 61
Scenario 2 89 97 60 62
Scenario 1: Revision of e9
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
NPV of the overall losses as a fraction of the 1990 NPV of total NO AIDS GDP when
unborn individuals are taken into account, for the base case. The variations are reported
in the appendix.
Table 21: Lost income through premature adult mortality, including unborn individuals
Interest Rate Scenario 1a Scenario 2b
0.0% p.a. 31 26
1.2% p.a. 29 24
5.0% p.a. 21 17
a Renegotiation of e9
b Delayed Expectations
Average values over all calibrations are reported. All values expressed as a % of the 1990
NPV of total NO AIDS GDP between 1990 and 2040.
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Table 22: Lost income through premature adult mortality, excluding unborn individuals
Interest Rate Scenario 1a Scenario 2b
(A2a) (A2b) (A2a) (A2b)
0.0% p.a. 11 24 12 19
0.7% p.a. 10 22 11 18
5.0% p.a. 8 18 9 14
a Renegotiation of e9
b Delayed Expectations
All values expressed as a % of the 1990 NPV of total NO AIDS GDP between 1990 and
2040
Table 22 gives the 1990 net present value (NPV) of the loss of income incurred through
premature adult mortality as a fraction of the NPV of total GDP in the period 1990-2040,
when unborn individuals are ignored, using assumptions (A2a) or (A2b). Three different
annual rates of interest are considered: first, r = 0; second, r = 0.7%, which corresponds
to the families’ own pure discount rate, as computed from β0 and β1; and third, r = 5%,
which is the interest rate employed in Bell et. al (2004). As expected, the effects of the
epidemic are stronger under assumption (A2b), as the levels of lost income per capita are
higher in that case. Whichever scenario is chosen the effects of the epidemic range from
8% to 12% of total GDP under assumption (A2a), and 5 to 13 percentage points more
under (A2b). Even when the incomes of unborn individuals are ignored, therefore, the
society suffers significant economic losses when HIV/AIDS breaks out.
9.2 Public Spending on Health
The effects of the program P, expressed as a % of the 2040 NO AIDS level, are set out
in table 23. Figure 3 describes three welfare measures relative to their respective levels
in the absence of the policy program, for all calibrations. In all variations, all measures
of aggregate welfare are higher if the program is undertaken. The results for individual
measures of welfare, however, are mixed: they are negative in some cases. To illustrate
the changes induced by the policy program P, consider the second scenario of the base
case, the results of which are reported in table 13 the lower half of table 30. Note that the
level of human capital after 2030 in the presence of the program is somewhat lower than
in its absence (8.349<8.355), although the levels of schooling are identical in all periods.
Recall that the level of human capital of a young adult depends on three variables: first,
the quality of schooling (zt), second, the amount of time she spends at school (et), and,
third, the average level of human capital of her parents/teachers
(
N2t λt+N
3
t λt−1
N2t +N
3
t
)
. The pol-
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Figure 3: The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic expressed as a % of the ’no policy’ levels,
all calibrations
The bars denote the maximum/minimum values the ratio can take over all calibrations.
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Table 23: The average effects of the public spending program P, expressed as a percentage
of the NO AIDS levels in 2040
λ per capita
GDP y
GDP Y Population
Base Case
Scenario 1 1.5 0.6 5.8 5.2
Scenario 2 0.5 -0.4 4.9 5.3
Variation 1 (Nmin)
Scenario 1 2.0 1.1 6.2 5.0
Scenario 2 1.2 0.3 5.4 5.1
Variation 2 (σt≥10)
Scenario 1 5.3 3.4 6.7 3.2
Scenario 2 5.7 3.3 7.2 3.8
Variation 3 (αt≥10)
Scenario 1 0.2 -0.4 7.2 7.7
Scenario 2 0.1 -0.5 7.3 7.8
Variation 3 (zt≥11)
Scenario 1 0.4 -0.6 4.5 5.1
Scenario 2 -0.1 -1.0 4.1 5.2
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
icy program P does not change either zt nor et – it does, however, change
N2t λt+N
3
t λt−1
N2t +N
3
t
:
more adults in age group a = 3 survive, so that the ratio of young, well-educated (a = 2)
parents to older parents (a = 3) shifts, thereby reducing the average level of human capi-
tal of the teachers. The factor
N2t λt+N
3
t λt−1
N2t +N
3
t
, which determines λ13, is 7.893 if the program
is undertaken, and 7.898 otherwise, and, consequently, λ13 is 8.349 in the presence of the
program, and 8.355 in its absence. With human capital being lower when P is undertaken,
the program can also have a negative impact on GDP per capita. In this case, another
effect of the program also plays a role: with mortality rates reduced, parents assume that
more of their children survive. As they cannot invest more in education – all children
already enjoy full-time schooling – they have more children: for example, in the case men-
tioned before, each family has 1.28 children in 2030 in the absence of the program, and
1.32 in its presence. Consequently, the total population is higher, which reduces GDP per
capita. As both effects can only be observed if schooling cannot be increased through the
policy program, neither of them appears in the case where school fees are not abolished
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(Variation 2): here, the policy program leads to an increase in schooling, and its effects
are strong and positive with respect to all measures of welfare. To sum up, the policy
program P can have negative effects on individual measures of welfare as is shifts the
structure of population, and thereby influences the intergenerational transfer of human
capital. Note, however, that the negative effects are generally small, and amount to no
more than 1.3%. Recall also that mortality rates are reduced in the presence of the pro-
gram, thereby extending life expectancy and therefore also the expected lifetime income.
As a consequnce, the overall effect of the program on individuals might be positive even
if per capita GDP is somewhat lower.
To assess the social profitability of the program P, we employ the methods presented
in section 8. Tables 40 and 41 in the appendix report the results when unborn individuals
are, and are not, considered, respectively. Assumption (A2) from section 8 now reads as
follows:
(A2) The level of human capital attained by all children will be either
(A2aˆ) the same level as in the AIDS case with a policy program.
(A2bˆ) the same level as in the AIDS case without a policy program.
Note that the levels of schooling and human capital are generally higher in the case of As-
sumption (A2aˆ), so that the effects of the policy program P will also be higher in that case.
Even though in some cases the levels of human capital and GDP per capita were lower
in the presence of the program than in its absence (see table 23), the program is always
profitable, as people live longer. This effect strongly dominates the small reductions in
human capital in all cases. Consequently, the discounted gains are at least three times
as high as the discounted costs, so that the program is very profitable indeed. Note also
that when computing the values in tables 40 and 41, we did not take into account the
program’s gains which accrue after 2040. More recent evidence suggests that the costs of
saving a DALY through HAART might be lower than those employed in the present essay
– in this case, the policy program would be even more profitable, as it saves and prolongs
more lives.
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10 Conclusion
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Kenya has had, and continues to have, a very damaging
impact on the country’s economy and population, both at the individual and at the ag-
gregate level. Four factors play a major role in determining the long-term dynamics.
First, there is the drop in the inter-generational transmission factor after 1970, which
leads to a direct reduction in the formation of human capital and to levels of schooling.
Second there is the reduction in labor productivity during the 1990s, as a consequence of
which, fertility and total population both fall. Third, there is the increase in mortality
rates after the full outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Fourth, there is the reduction
in education costs during the 2000s. The individuals’ reaction to the epidemic depends,
first, on when they realize its effects, and second on the social mechanisms governing the
way exogenous shocks are dealt with. As has been argued in this essay, changes in the
inter-generational transmission factor and the labor productivity factor can mitigate or
intensify the epidemic’s consequences. Similarly, measures aimed at changing N1min can
also form part of an anti-AIDS program.
The policy program called P, which is fully financed by foreign grants, has a positive
effect on all aggregate-level welfare measures. In reaction to P, parents normally increase
the level of schooling their children enjoy, and therefore their future income and per capita
GDP. Combining P with measures aimed at influencing N1min, αt and/or zt, can further
mitigate the effects of the epidemic. Note, however, that comparing P with the other
measures discussed in the variations is difficult, as the costs incurred in implementing the
changes in the latter are unknown. The gains which accrue if P is undertaken outweigh
many-fold the costs incurred in financing it, even if the overall returns to this investment
that occur after 2040 are left out of account.
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11 Appendix
Table 24: Calibration Results: Averages
A = 0.170(0.03) ² = 0.53(0.003) η = 1.444(0.41)
µ = 0.535(0.055) χ = 0.129(0.029) b =
282.69(24.85)
β0 = 1.7388(0.3968) β1 = 1.5057(0.3444)
t λt zt αt
2 1.01 (0) 1.6861 (0.066) –
3 1.6714 (0.023) 1.6961 (0.066) –
4 2.2258 (0.054) 1.0198 (0.019) –
5 2.3984 (0.050) 1.0198 (0.019) 1417 (303)
6 3.0289 (0.078) 1.0198 (0.019) 1417 (303)
7 4.3109 (0.135) 1.0198 (0.019) 1417 (303)
8 6.1433 (0.240) 0.5631 (0.017) 1417 (303)
9 5.3279 (0.286) 0.5631 (0.017) 1417 (303)
10 5.7249 (0.365) 0.5631 (0.017) 1152 (244)
Standard Deviation in parentheses.
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Table 25: Summary of results, all calibrations: The Benchmark Cases
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.22 1.10 1.36
AIDS 1.11 1.08 1.15
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.60 0.56 0.65
GDP 0.53 0.47 0.61
GDP per capita 0.88 0.85 0.93
Human Capital 0.81 0.80 0.84
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.22 1.10 1.36
AIDS 1.12 1.09 1.18
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.61 0.57 0.66
GDP 0.59 0.53 0.65
GDP per capita 0.96 0.93 0.99
Human Capital 0.89 0.88 0.90
a Ratio of total 2040 population in the simulations to total 2040 population in the US
Bureau of Census data, as reported in tables 8 and 9 respectively.
b Population
AIDS
t=14
PopulationNO AIDSt=14
,
Y AIDSt=14
Y NO AIDSt=14
,
yAIDSt=14
yNO AIDSt=14
,
λAIDSt=14
λNO AIDSt=14
Table 26: Summary of results, all calibrations: Variation 1
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.23 1.11 1.37
AIDS 1.15 1.12 1.19
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.62 0.57 0.67
GDP 0.54 0.48 0.63
GDP per capita 0.87 0.84 0.94
Human Capital 0.80 0.79 0.85
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.23 1.11 1.37
AIDS 1.16 1.13 1.22
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.63 0.59 0.67
GDP 0.60 0.54 0.67
GDP per capita 0.96 0.93 0.99
Human Capital 0.88 0.87 0.90
a Ratio of total 2040 population in the simulations to total 2040 population in the US
Bureau of Census data, as reported in tables 8 and 9 respectively.
b Population
AIDS
t=14
PopulationNO AIDSt=14
,
Y AIDSt=14
Y NO AIDSt=14
,
yAIDSt=14
yNO AIDSt=14
,
λAIDSt=14
λNO AIDSt=14
54
Table 27: Summary of results, all calibrations: Variation 2
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.14 1.09 1.23
AIDS 1.20 1.13 1.31
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.70 0.68 0.71
GDP 0.49 0.47 0.55
GDP per capita 0.70 0.66 0.79
Human Capital 0.58 0.54 0.67
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.14 1.09 1.23
AIDS 1.11 1.06 1.18
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.64 0.63 0.68
GDP 0.54 0.50 0.60
GDP per capita 0.83 0.79 0.89
Human Capital 0.72 0.68 0.78
a Ratio of total 2040 population in the simulations to total 2040 population in the US
Bureau of Census data, as reported in tables 8 and 9 respectively.
b Population
AIDS
t=14
PopulationNO AIDSt=14
,
Y AIDSt=14
Y NO AIDSt=14
,
yAIDSt=14
yNO AIDSt=14
,
λAIDSt=14
λNO AIDSt=14
Table 28: Summary of results, all calibrations: Variation 3
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.50 1.32 1.71
AIDS 1.29 1.25 1.37
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.57 0.53 0.65
GDP 0.50 0.45 0.60
GDP per capita 0.89 0.86 0.92
Human Capital 0.83 0.81 0.84
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.50 1.32 1.71
AIDS 1.30 1.26 1.37
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.57 0.53 0.65
GDP 0.55 0.50 0.64
GDP per capita 0.96 0.94 0.98
Human Capital 0.89 0.89 0.90
a Ratio of total 2040 population in the simulations to total 2040 population in the US
Bureau of Census data, as reported in tables 8 and 9 respectively.
b Population
AIDS
t=14
PopulationNO AIDSt=14
,
Y AIDSt=14
Y NO AIDSt=14
,
yAIDSt=14
yNO AIDSt=14
,
λAIDSt=14
λNO AIDSt=14
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Table 29: Summary of results, all calibrations: Variation 4
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.14 1.06 1.30
AIDS 1.06 1.03 1.11
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.61 0.56 0.66
GDP 0.55 0.49 0.62
GDP per capita 0.90 0.86 0.94
Human Capital 0.82 0.81 0.84
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Deviation from census data (2040) a NO AIDS 1.14 1.06 1.30
AIDS 1.07 1.04 1.12
Effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (2040)b Population 0.62 0.57 0.66
GDP 0.60 0.55 0.66
GDP per capita 0.97 0.96 0.99
Human Capital 0.89 0.89 0.90
a Ratio of total 2040 population in the simulations to total 2040 population in the US
Bureau of Census data, as reported in tables 8 and 9 respectively.
b Population
AIDS
t=14
PopulationNO AIDSt=14
,
Y AIDSt=14
Y NO AIDSt=14
,
yAIDSt=14
yNO AIDSt=14
,
λAIDSt=14
λNO AIDSt=14
Table 30: The Policy Program P: Benchmark Case
AIDS, Scenario 1: Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.57 1186 3434 28944 21.91
11 5.26 7107 1.05 0.98 1348 4196 31122 22.76
12 6.71 7055 1.05 1.00 1502 5025 33445 23.73
13 7.73 8295 1.29 1.00 1587 6000 37814 25.40
14 9.14 9573 1.33 1.00 1776 7744 43602 27.09
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.59 1255 3634 28944 22.05
11 5.69 7107 1.05 1.00 1446 4499 31122 22.98
12 7.38 7055 1.05 1.00 1630 5451 33445 23.98
13 8.35 8496 1.32 1.00 1711 6523 38113 25.67
14 9.86 9840 1.35 1.00 1922 8493 44195 27.38
56
Table 31: The Policy Program P: Variation 1: The level of N1min
AIDS, Scenario 1: Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8178 1.48 0.56 1179 3437 29155 21.91
11 5.21 7518 1.10 0.93 1324 4216 31854 22.75
12 6.51 7670 1.10 1.00 1455 5072 34857 23.70
13 7.61 8466 1.22 1.00 1579 6170 39085 25.36
14 8.97 9834 1.30 1.00 1751 7890 45055 26.95
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8178 1.48 0.58 1248 3638 29155 22.04
11 5.63 7518 1.10 1.00 1416 4509 31854 22.96
12 7.34 7670 1.10 1.00 1594 5557 34857 23.97
13 8.32 8681 1.25 1.00 1722 6785 39407 25.66
14 9.83 10077 1.32 1.00 1923 8775 45626 27.29
Table 32: The Policy Program P: Variation 2: Abolition of school fees
AIDS, scenario 1: Revision of e9
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.37 1199 3471 28944 21.85
11 4.37 7107 1.05 0.58 1278 3977 31122 22.48
12 4.89 7684 1.14 0.66 1261 4335 34375 23.15
13 5.19 9517 1.41 0.71 1202 4838 40248 24.51
14 5.72 9968 1.24 0.89 1274 5854 45942 25.83
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.38 1269 3673 28944 21.98
11 4.70 7107 1.05 0.64 1363 4243 31122 22.69
12 5.54 7055 1.05 0.79 1407 4707 33445 23.41
13 6.07 8455 1.31 0.90 1381 5253 38052 24.85
14 7.19 8940 1.23 1.00 1515 6488 42819 26.39
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Table 33: The Policy Program P: Variation 3: Recovery of αt
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.45
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.57 1186 3434 28944 22.00
11 5.26 7494 1.11 1.00 1475 4673 31687 23.15
12 6.76 8127 1.18 1.00 1615 5719 35401 24.19
13 7.78 10463 1.47 1.00 1683 7136 42406 25.94
14 9.22 12559 1.44 1.00 1916 9844 51376 27.50
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.61
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.59 1255 3634 28944 22.14
11 5.69 7551 1.12 1.00 1578 5014 31770 23.37
12 7.38 8088 1.17 1.00 1753 6205 35397 24.43
13 8.38 10690 1.50 1.00 1809 7734 42754 26.19
14 9.90 12922 1.47 1.00 2060 10743 52140 27.78
Table 34: The Policy Program P: Variation 4: Recovery of zt
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.42 1324 3107 23475 23.35
10 4.97 8040 1.46 0.58 1186 3433 28944 21.96
11 5.29 7107 1.05 1.00 1351 4203 31122 22.87
12 7.69 7055 1.05 1.00 1586 5306 33445 23.97
13 9.46 7650 1.19 1.00 1825 6726 36851 25.86
14 12.22 8479 1.23 1.00 2199 9091 41348 27.76
AIDS, scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop. EtU
9 5.29 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475 26.47
10 5.67 8040 1.46 0.60 1255 3633 28944 22.10
11 5.72 7107 1.05 1.00 1449 4509 31122 23.09
12 8.41 7055 1.05 1.00 1718 5747 33445 24.21
13 10.21 7794 1.21 1.00 1969 7297 37066 26.12
14 13.18 8672 1.25 1.00 2378 9935 41774 28.04
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Table 35: The effects of P, all calibrations: The Benchmark Cases
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 5.2 4.8 5.6
GDP 5.8 3.5 6.8
GDP per Capita 0.6 -1.2 1.3
Human Capital 1.5 -0.1 2.3
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 5.3 4.8 5.6
GDP 4.9 3.6 6.9
GDP per Capita -0.4 -1.2 1.3
Human Capital 0.5 -0.1 2.2
a Population
AIDS, P
t=14 −PopulationAIDSt=14
PopulationAIDSt=14
,
Y AIDS, Pt=14 −Y AIDSt=14
Y AIDSt=14
,
yAIDS, Pt=14 −yAIDSt=14
yAIDSt=14
,
λAIDS, Pt=14 −λAIDSt=14
λAIDSt=14
.
All values in %
Table 36: The effects of P, all calibrations: Variation 1
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 5.0 4.6 5.5
GDP 6.2 3.4 6.6
GDP per Capita 1.1 -1.2 1.3
Human Capital 2.0 -0.1 2.4
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 5.1 4.6 5.4
GDP 5.4 3.5 6.7
GDP per Capita 0.3 -1.1 1.4
Human Capital 1.2 -0.1 2.3
a Population
AIDS, P
t=14 −PopulationAIDSt=14
PopulationAIDSt=14
,
Y AIDS, Pt=14 −Y AIDSt=14
Y AIDSt=14
,
yAIDS, Pt=14 −yAIDSt=14
yAIDSt=14
,
λAIDS, Pt=14 −λAIDSt=14
λAIDSt=14
.
All values in %
Table 37: The effects of P, all calibrations: Variation 2
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 3.2 2.3 5.1
GDP 6.7 6.1 7.5
GDP per Capita 3.4 1.0 4.2
Human Capital 5.3 3.0 6.8
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 3.8 3.3 5.6
GDP 7.2 6.2 7.4
GDP per Capita 3.3 1.0 3.9
Human Capital 5.7 2.4 6.8
a Population
AIDS, P
t=14 −PopulationAIDSt=14
PopulationAIDSt=14
,
Y AIDS, Pt=14 −Y AIDSt=14
Y AIDSt=14
,
yAIDS, Pt=14 −yAIDSt=14
yAIDSt=14
,
λAIDS, Pt=14 −λAIDSt=14
λAIDSt=14
.
All values in %
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Table 38: The effects of P, all calibrations: Variation 3
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 7.7 5.9 9.1
GDP 7.2 4.9 8.8
GDP per Capita -0.4 -1.0 0.3
Human Capital 0.2 0.0 0.9
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 7.8 5.9 9.1
GDP 7.3 4.9 9.0
GDP per Capita -0.5 -0.9 -0.1
Human Capital 0.1 0.0 0.2
a Population
AIDS, P
t=14 −PopulationAIDSt=14
PopulationAIDSt=14
,
Y AIDS, Pt=14 −Y AIDSt=14
Y AIDSt=14
,
yAIDS, Pt=14 −yAIDSt=14
yAIDSt=14
,
λAIDS, Pt=14 −λAIDSt=14
λAIDSt=14
.
All values in %
Table 39: The effects of P, all calibrations: Variation 4
Scenario 1: Renegotiation of e9 Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 5.1 4.8 5.4
GDP 4.5 3.4 6.7
GDP per Capita -0.6 -1.3 1.3
Human Capital 0.4 -0.1 2.3
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations Average Min. Max.
Effect of the Policy Program P (2040)a Population 5.2 4.8 5.3
GDP 4.1 3.5 4.4
GDP per Capita -1.0 -1.3 -0.9
Human Capital -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
a Population
AIDS, P
t=14 −PopulationAIDSt=14
PopulationAIDSt=14
,
Y AIDS, Pt=14 −Y AIDSt=14
Y AIDSt=14
,
yAIDS, Pt=14 −yAIDSt=14
yAIDSt=14
,
λAIDS, Pt=14 −λAIDSt=14
λAIDSt=14
.
All values in %
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Table 40: The policy program P: Profitabilitya, including unborn individuals, all calibra-
tions
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Average Min. Max. Average Min. Max.
Base Case
0.0% p.a. 8 6 9 8 7 10
0.7% p.a. 7 6 8 7 6 9
5.0% p.a. 5 4 5 4 4 5
Variation 1: The level of N1min
0.0% p.a. 9 6 9 9 7 10
0.7% p.a. 8 6 8 8 6 9
5.0% p.a. 5 4 5 5 4 5
Variation 2: The level of σt
0.0% p.a. 8 7 9 9 8 9
0.7% p.a. 7 7 8 8 7 8
5.0% p.a. 4 4 5 5 5 5
Variation 3: The level of αt
0.0% p.a. 13 11 15 14 12 16
0.7% p.a. 12 10 13 13 10 15
5.0% p.a. 7 6 8 8 6 9
Variation 4: The level of zt
0.0% p.a. 8 6 10 7 7 8
0.7% p.a. 7 6 9 7 6 7
5.0% p.a. 4 4 6 4 4 4
aAll entries expressed as multiples of the 1990 NPV of the costs of P.
Scenario 1: Revision of e9
Scenario 2: Delayed Expectations
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Table 41: The policy program P: Profitabilitya, excluding unborn individuals, all calibra-
tions
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
(A2aˆ) (A2bˆ) (A2aˆ) (A2bˆ)
Avg. Min. Max. Avg. Min. Max. Avg. Min. Max. Avg. Min. Max.
Base Case
0.0% p.a. 5 5 5 7 5 7 5 5 5 6 5 8
0.7% p.a. 4 4 5 6 4 7 5 4 5 5 4 7
5.0% p.a. 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 5
Variation 1: The level of N1min
0.0% p.a. 5 5 5 7 4 8 5 5 5 7 5 8
0.7% p.a. 4 4 4 6 4 7 5 4 5 6 4 7
5.0% p.a. 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 5
Variation 1: The level of σt
0.0% p.a. 4 4 5 7 5 7 5 4 5 8 6 8
0.7% p.a. 4 4 4 6 5 6 4 4 4 7 5 7
5.0% p.a. 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
Variation 1: The level of αt
0.0% p.a. 5 5 6 6 5 7 6 5 6 6 5 6
0.7% p.a. 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 6
5.0% p.a. 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4
Variation 1: The level of zt
0.0% p.a. 5 5 5 6 5 8 5 5 6 5 5 6
0.7% p.a. 4 4 5 5 4 7 5 4 5 5 4 5
5.0% p.a. 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 3 3 3
aAll entries expressed as multiples of the 1990 NPV of the costs of P.
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
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